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Abstract
We model (interactive) resources that provide Alice with a string
X and a guarantee that any Eve interacting with her interface of
the resource obtains a (quantum) system E such that the conditional
(smooth) min-entropy of X given E is lower bounded by some k,
Hδmin(X |E) ≥ k. This (abstract) resource specification encompasses
any setting that results in the honest players holding such a string
(or aborting). For example, it could be constructed from, e.g., noisy
channels, quantum key distribution (QKD), or a violation of Bell in-
equalities, which all may be used to derive bounds on the min-entropy
of X .
As a first application, we use this min-entropy resource to mod-
ularize key distribution (KD) schemes by dividing them in two parts,
which may be analyzed separately. In the first part, a KD protocol con-
structs a min-entropy resource given the (physical) resources available
in the specific setting considered. In the second, it distills secret key
from the min-entropy resource—i.e., it constructs a secret key resource.
We prove security for a generic key distillation protocol that may use
any min-entropy resource. Since the notion of resource construction is
composable— security of a composed protocol follows from the secu-
rity of its parts— this reduces proving security of a KD protocol (e.g.,
QKD) to proving that it constructs a min-entropy resource.
As a second application, we provide a composable security proof
for the recent Fehr-Salvail protocol [EUROCRYPT 2017] that authen-
ticates classical messages with a quantum message authentication code
(Q-MAC), and recycles all the key upon successfully verifying the au-
thenticity of the message. This protocol uses (and recycles) a non-
uniform key, which we model as consuming and constructing a min-
entropy resource.
∗
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1 Introduction
When formalizing information processing systems, one models the informa-
tion that matters, e.g., the input and output values of the system. A concrete
implementation is much more complex, e.g., values are output at certain
times, encoded in some physical form. If the exact physical encoding or
timing information is not considered relevant, this is generally not modeled
as part of the abstract representation of the information processing system.
Such a model can be described as a specification of a system, since it specifies
certain behaviors that the system must have, but leaves many (irrelevant)
parameters unspecified.
The level of specification of information processing systems found in
the literature is often fixed, e.g., the Universal Composability (UC) frame-
work [1,2] provides a concrete model of systems in terms of interactive Turing
machines, and all objects in the framework must be specified in the given
language (or something equivalent) with the given level of specificity. Using
such a framework, one can neither model more specific objects (e.g., a pro-
tocol run at a specific location in time and space), nor less specific objects
(e.g., a non-deterministic behavior), and even less compose such objects with
each other.
The Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework [3] uses a top-down ap-
proach to model cryptographic security, which does not have this limitation.
The more traditional bottom-up approach starts with a concrete model of
information processing systems, then defines how these systems communi-
cate, how scheduling is performed, how parties are corrupted, etc. Instead
of this, AC starts on the most abstract level. It models abstract objects
satisfying certain axioms that are needed to make cryptographic statements.
These objects can then be instantiated with, e.g., different models of compu-
tation, communication, scheduling, etc. In particular, as done in [4], AC can
be instantiated with a model of resource specifications, where two resources
satisfy a relation R ⊂ S, if R is more specific than S, i.e., any concrete system
satisfying the specifications of R also satisfies those of S. Such resource spec-
ifications can be composed and a security statements about the composed
system may be derived from the framework.
1.1 Contributions
Our main contribution is to use the concept of resource specifications [3–6]
to model min-entropy resources, i.e., systems that provide honest player(s)
with a random string X and an adversary with a (possibly quantum) system
E such that the joint state ρXE has bounded conditional (smooth) min-
entropy,1 Hδmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k. The same techniques could be used for other
entropy measures. The reason we choose the smooth min-entropy, is that
1A formal definition of smooth min-entropy is provided in Appendix A.3.
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it has many applications in cryptography, e.g., it caracterizes the maximum
amount of secret key that can be extracted from a source [7].
Specifications are essential in modeling min-entropy resources, since we
generally do not know (and do not care) how the joint state ρXE was gener-
ated— whether the adversary can influence it or not, whether this is done
with one round or multiple rounds of interaction. Any system which inter-
acts arbitrarily with the adversary, but provides a random string X to the
honest player(s) with a guaranteed lower bound on its conditional min-en-
tropy satisfies the specification, and can be used by protocols requiring such
a bound.
We then present two applications in which these min-entropy specifica-
tions are needed to model the security of cryptographic schemes. In the first,
we show how to distill secret key from any min-entropy resource shared be-
tween two players. The protocol is standard, it uses error correction and
privacy amplification to construct a secret key resource. But the proof is not
restricted to a certain context or specific source of randomness, it is valid
for any min-entropy resource, e.g., whether it is constructed by noisy classi-
cal channels [8–10], standard quantum key distribution (QKD) [7,11–14] or
even untrusted (but non-communicating) devices [15–18]. We discuss this
application further in Section 1.2.
Our second application is to provide a composable security proof for a
recent authentication protocol by Fehr and Salvail [19,20], that encodes clas-
sical messages in quantum states. Due to the quantum properties of these
states, all of the secret key used in the protocol can be recycled once the
recipient has confirmed the authenticity of the message. But a small loss
of entropy occurs in the key, so it cannot be modeled as a standard (uni-
form) key resource [21]. Instead, we model the shared key as a min-entropy
specification, and prove that a slightly modified version [20] of the original
Fehr-Salvail protocol [19] uses a min-entropy resource and an insecure chan-
nel to construct an authentic channel and a new min-entropy resource (the
recycled key). This result is discussed further in Section 1.3.
1.2 Distilling Secret Key
Secret key distillation from a joint probability distribution PXY E between
three players, Alice, Bob, and Eve, was proposed independently by Mau-
rer [8] and by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [9]. This problem has since been gen-
eralized to many different contexts, e.g., in a finite setting [10], when E
is quantum and the tripartite state ρXY E has been obtained from a QKD
protocol [7,12–14], or in a device-independent setting, where the devices gen-
erating ρXY E are untrusted [17, 18]. The protocols always follow the same
pattern: if needed, one performs some advantage distillation to increase the
correlations between the honest players, then one performs error correction
so that they share the same strings, and finally privacy amplification to ex-
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tract a secret key. The different security proofs found in the literature that
one can obtain secret key given a bound on the correlations of the state
ρXY E are very similar, with (small) variations to account for the changes in
context.
This overlap between different works can be avoided by employing a
modular (composable) approach: a task is divided in different parts, and the
security of each part is proven separately. Thus, if one part is changed, only
that piece requires a new security proof; the new piece can then be seamlessly
plugged into the other parts. The AC framework [3, 4] formalizes this as a
resource theory: a cryptographic protocol uses some resource specification
R to construct some other resource specification S. Different protocols may
be used to construct S in different ways. The next part of a cryptosystem
may use S to construct T, and is oblivious to how S was constructed. The
piece constructing S may be changed at will, without affecting anything else.
More concretely, we prove in this work that a min-entropy resource may
be used to construct a secret key resource—using the aforementioned steps
of error correction and privacy amplification. As a consequence, information-
theoretic key distribution protocols (e.g., QKD) do not need to show that
they produce secret key (and needlessly repeat many of the steps), it is
sufficient to prove that they construct a min-entropy resource, i.e., that
they generate a raw key with a bound on its min-entropy. Bounds on the
security of the final key then follow generically from the composability of
the AC framework by plugging this into our work.
This also provides clear conditions on the min-entropy of the raw key
that are sufficient for the error correction and privacy amplification to go
through (namely, that the constructed resource corresponds to a min-entropy
specification, which we define in Section 3).
1.3 Quantum Authentication of Classical Messages
As far back as 1982, Bennett, Brassard, and Breidbart [22] discussed how
one could authenticate a classical message in a quantum state, so that after
confirming reception of the original message, the secret key used by the pro-
tocol can be reused. A recent breakthrough result by Fehr and Salvail [19,20]
showed how to do this with a prepare-and-measure protocol, i.e., one which
involves only preparing and measuring single qubit states, and which could
already be implemented with today’s technology [23]. This has many inter-
esting applications, e.g., it could be used as a subroutine for authenticating
messages in QKD.2 One would then not need to sacrifice any key bits for
authentication.
Fehr and Salvail use a trace-distance-type security criterion that is tai-
lored for substitution attacks— Eve changes the message being sent. They
2Whether this application is practical depends on the noise tolerance of the Fehr-Salvail
protocol, which was has not been worked out [19].
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then show that this criterion is sufficient to prove that their protocol can
be composed sequentially with itself. Different contexts, such as sequential
composition with other protocols,3 parallel composition,3 or impersonation
attacks— Eve sends a forged cipher to Bob without knowledge of a valid
message-cipher pair— were not explicitly considered in [19].4 When key
recycling is involved, impersonation attacks are particularly powerful, be-
cause they allow Eve to obtain part of the recycled key after Bob receives
the forged cipher (e.g., he uses it in a protocol which leaks it, like a one-
time pad), which she can use to generate a message correlated to the key
and provide it to Alice for authentication. The resulting cipher could then
potentially leak more information about the remaining secret key than a ci-
pher prepared by Alice under a substitution attack, where the message and
key are independent. Note that even if the protocol is only composed in a
restricted setting in which the recycled key is not leaked, the accept/reject
bit of the receiver is generally correlated to the recycled key and cannot be
hidden, which leads to the same type of attacks.
This raises the question of whether there are other attacks or vulnera-
bilities that have not been considered, and what security criteria must be
satisfied for the protocol to be usable, e.g., as a subroutine in QKD. This
is answered in a generic way by composable frameworks. In the AC lan-
guage, a QKD protocol uses an authentic channel resource specification A
for the players to communicate [21]. A standard authentication scheme that
appends a message authentication code (MAC) to the message constructs
such an authentic channel A [24]. And hence, by the composition theorem
of the framework, the two may be composed, and the total error is the sum
of the errors of the individual protocols.
In this work we perform such a composable analysis for a slightly mod-
ified version [20] of the original Fehr-Salvail protocol [19]. We show that
this protocol uses a min-entropy resource Hkmin, a uniform key resource K,
and an insecure channel Q to construct a new min-entropy resource Hkmin, a
new uniform key K, and an authentic channel A. The constructed channel
A may then be used by any protocol requiring such a resource, while the
constructed key resources Hkmin and K (the recycled keys) may be plugged
3Ad hoc security definitions for individual protocols— e.g., trace-distance-type crite-
ria— do not necessarily guarantee that a composed protocol is secure. When using such
definitions, one needs to additionally prove (for every different context) that the protocol
can be safely used, and work out the corresponding error. For example, Fehr and Salvail
do this for sequential composition of their protocol with itself [19]. This can be avoided
by using composable security definitions— e.g., the notion of resource construction from
AC—which guarantee security in any environment. The error of the composed protocol
is then the sum of the erros of the individual components.
4Following an initial draft of the current work pointing out the issue with impersonation
attacks and proposing a solution that recycles less key in the case of a reject, an extended
version of the Fehr-Salvail paper was made available [20], which sketches how the protocol
can be modified to resist impersonation attacks without any extra loss of key.
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into the next round of authentication— or any other protocol requiring such
keys.
1.4 Structure of the paper
We start by introducing the AC framework in Section 2, where we instantiate
the systems with resource specifications. In Section 3 we then define the
min-entropy specifications that are used throughout this work. In Section 4
we show how to distill secret key from such a min-entropy resource. And
in Section 5 we provide a composable security proof for the Fehr-Salvail
authentication protocol, in which the non-uniform keys are modeled as min-
entropy resources.
2 Constructive Cryptography
The AC framework [3, 4] models cryptography as a resource theory, e.g., a
QKD protocol constructs a secret key resource from an authentic channel
and an insecure quantum channel. More generally, a security statement is
a constructive statement of the form “γ constructs S from R with error ε,”
which we denote
R
γ,ε−−→ S. (1)
For this reason the framework is also called constructive cryptography in the
literature [4, 25].
In (1), R and S are resource specifications denoting the resources that are
used by the construction and the ones that are achieved by the construction
γ, respectively. Naturally, if γ constructs S from R and π constructs T from
S, then one expects that applying both constructions in sequence constructs
T from R with an error which is the sum of the individual errors, i.e.,
R
γ,ε−−→ S and S π,δ−−→ T =⇒ R π◦γ,ε+δ−−−−−→ T. (2)
Similarly, if γ1 constructs S1 from R1 and γ2 constructs S2 from R2, then
one expects that if resources R1 and R2 are both available simultaneously,
and one applies both constructions, this should result in the resources S1
and S2 both being constructed, i.e.,
R1
γ1,ε1−−−→ S1 and R2 γ2,ε2−−−→ S2 =⇒ R1‖R2 γ1|γ2,ε1+ε2−−−−−−−→ S1‖S2. (3)
In the rest of this section we formalize the notions of resource speci-
fications and construction, which allows us to define constructive security
statement such as Eq. (1) and prove that Eqs. (2) and (3) hold with this
notion of construction. We do this following the AC top-down approach, i.e.,
we only define the properties of the objects that are needed, allowing them
to be instantiated with any concrete model that satisfies these properties.
6
Noiseless channel Sid
ρ ρ
(a) A noiseless channel.
Depolarizing channels Rp
ρ Eλ(ρ)
(b) Any depolarizing channel given
by Eλ(ρ) = (1−λ)ρ+ λd I, where λ ≤
p.
Figure 1 – Two examples of resource specifications. (a) is a specification that
contains one channel, the identity. (b) is a specification for any depolarization
channel with λ ≤ p.
2.1 Specifications
As mentioned in Section 1, a specification can be thought of as a (partial)
description of an object to the accuracy needed for the task at hand. This
concept is much more general than modeling cryptographic systems, and
has been used to model resource theories in physics [5, 6]. For example, let
S denote a chair. A chair with wheels R is more specific than a chair. We
thus have R ⊂ S, where ⊂ is a transitive relation meaning “more specific
than”. A piece of furniture T is less specific, hence T ⊃ S. As another
example, consider instructions for building a model car, which state that a
piece should be painted. Let R denote the pair of the piece from the model
car and some paint, and let γ denote the action of painting the piece. Then
given R, γ constructs a painted piece S. When actually building the model
car, the paint chosen will have a certain color, e.g., red. Let R′ denote the
pair of the piece from the model car and red paint. We then have R′ ⊂ R,
because R′ is more specific than R. And applying γ to R′ we obtain S′ ⊂ S,
where S′ is the piece of the car painted red. The instructions apply to
anything that satisfies the specifications, in particular, to objects that are
more specific.
We define specifications as in [4]: a specification is a subset of a universe
Φ of objects, namely those that satisfy the specification. The relation R ⊂ S
for R, S ∈ P(Φ) is then simply the subset relation, where P(Φ) denotes the
power set of Φ.5 We call the elements R ∈ Φ atomic resources, and the
specifications R ∈ P(Φ) are resource specifications.
As two examples, we have illustrated in Figure 1 specifications for noise-
less and noisy channels. Here the atomic resources correspond to individual
channels defined by their input and output behavior, and the specification
denotes any set of channels satisfying the specification, e.g., depolarizing
channels with noise λ ≤ p as in Figure 1b.
5Specifications are more general than this, and may be instantiated in other ways than
with sets.
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Depolarizing ch. Rp
α β
ρ σ σ˜ ρ˜
Figure 2 – Error correction converters α and β are applied to Alice and Bob’s
interfaces of the channel specification Rp.
2.2 Converters
To model cryptographic protocols, we consider resources that have interfaces,
where each interface can be accessed by one user. For example, the channel
specifications from Figure 1 have an input interface and an output interface,
with which the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) may interact— to send
and receive messages, respectively. We usually label interfaces so as to make
explicit who controls the interface, e.g., A, B, E, for Alice, Bob, and Eve.
A local operation performed at one interface is called a converter. For
example, Alice may encode her message with a converter α and Bob may
decode it with a converter β, as drawn in Figure 2. Formally, we consider a
set of objects Σ, called converters, which are functions mapping a resource
specification to another specification, i.e., α : P(Φ) → P(Φ) for α ∈ Σ.
For example, the resource constructed in Figure 2 is given by β(α(Rp))—
or, equivalently, α(β(Rp))— which we simply write βαRp (or αβRp). We
usually draw converters with rounded corners.
We often use subscripts to denote the interface to which a converter ap-
plies, e.g., βBαARp. Converters applied at different interfaces must commute
(as in Figure 2), i.e.,
βBαAR = αAβBR.
Composition of converters, β ◦ α, is defined by
(β ◦ α)R := β(αR).
Converters must conserve the specificity relation, i.e.,
R ⊂ S =⇒ αR ⊂ αS.
The set Σ must also be closed under composition and contain an identity
element id ∈ Σ satisfying
id ◦α = α ◦ id = α.
In this work we usually write converters for honest players on the left of the
resources, and converters for dishonest players on the right, i.e., we write
αARσE instead of σEαAR, where E denotes Eve’s interface.
Note that a set of converters Σ that are maps α : Φ → Φ on the set of
atomic resources satisfying the properties above immediately induces a set
of converters on resource specifications with
αR := {αR : R ∈ R}.
8
2.3 Approximations
After constructing the resource βαRp illustrated in Figure 2, one typically
wants to state that it approximately corresponds to a noiseless channel Sid,
i.e., βαRp ⊂ Sεid, where Sεid is an ε-ball around Sid containing any channel
that is ε-close to Sid. Such an ε-ball is defined with respect to a pseudo-
metric on atomic resources, d : Φ× Φ→ R+,
R
ε := {S ∈ Φ : ∃R ∈ R, d(R,S) ≤ ε}.
It follows from the triangle inequality of the pseudo-metric that
(Rε)δ ⊂ Rε+δ.
Furthermore, if the pseudo-metric is contractive, i.e., for any α ∈ Σ and any
R,S ∈ Φ, d(αR, αS) ≤ d(R,S), then
αRε ⊂ (αR)ε.
2.4 Resource Composition
If two resources R and S are simultaneously accessible to the players, we wish
to write this as one resource corresponding to the (parallel) composition of
both, i.e., they are merged into one resource such that the interfaces of
each resource are simultaneously available to each player. To do this, we
define a parallel composition operation on resource specifications ‖ : P(Φ)×
P(Φ)→ P(Φ) and write R‖S for the resulting specification. For example, a
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol usually requires two resources to
be available to the players: an insecure quantum channel Q and a (multiple
use, two-way) authentic classical channel Ac.6 As drawn in Figure 3, the
channel Q just delivers the (quantum) message to Eve and allows her to
replace it with an arbitrary message that is sent to Bob. The channel Ac
faithfully delivers (classical) messages between Alice and Bob, but provides
Eve with copies.7 The players thus have access to the resource Ac‖Q and
run their protocol corresponding to a pair of converters (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ).
8 The
constructed system is given by the specification πqkdB π
qkd
A (A
c‖Q).
6The superscript c in Ac represents the number of uses of the channel, which we usually
denote by an unspecified constant c.
7In order to satisfy the requirement of sequential scheduling for the specific instantiation
of atomic resources with quantum combs (see Appendix B.1, in particular, Remark B.1),
A
c does not immediately output two messages at Eve’s and the receiver’s interfaces. Ac
outputs a single message at the receiver’s interace. Upon a request from Eve at her
interface, it then gives her a copy of the messages that were sent. To simplify Figure 3,
we do not draw the extra “request arrows”, but only the information that is output by
the systems. These requests are not needed for an instantiation of systems such as causal
boxes that supports more complex scheduling (see Appendix B.2).
8Similarly to the authentic channel Ac, piqkdA and pi
qkd
B do not spontaneously output the
key generated, they wait for a request to output it. Furthermore, the protocol starts with
pi
qkd
A being activated at its outer interface, which is not drawn in Figure 3 either.
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πqkdA
Alice
πqkdB
Bob
Eve
Authentic channel Ac
Insecure channel Q
t t
t
kA,⊥ kB ,⊥
ρ ρ′
Figure 3 – The real QKD setting, with Alice on the left, Bob on the right and
Eve below. Resources Ac and Q are available to the honest players, who run
their protocol (πqkdA , π
qkd
B ). At the end of this they either hold keys (kA, kB)
or produce an error ⊥.
This notion of parallel composition of resources induces a notion of par-
allel composition of converters α|β, defined as
(α|β)(R‖S) := (αR)‖(βS).
We require ‖ to be associative, and when multiple resources are in parallel,
we add subscripts to the resources and converters to clarify how they connect,
e.g, (α1|β23)(R1‖S2‖T3)— or (αA1 |βB23)(R1‖S2‖T3) when we additionally
need to denote the interface to which the converters connect. Naturally, we
also require that the specificity relation be conserved, i.e.,
R ⊂ S =⇒ R‖T ⊂ S‖T and T‖R ⊂ T‖S.
As for converters, if an operation ‖ with the same properties is defined
on atomic resources, then this yields a parallel composition operation on
specifications, defined as
R‖S := {R‖S : R ∈ R,S ∈ S}.
And if the pseudo-metric is context-insensitive, i.e., for any atomic resources
R,S,T ∈ Φ, d(R‖T,S‖T) ≤ d(R,S) and d(T‖R,T‖S) ≤ d(R,S), then
R
ε‖S ⊂ (R‖S)ε and R‖Sε ⊂ (R‖S)ε.
2.5 Cryptographic Security
In a context where some players are dishonest, one typically does not have
an exact description of how they may influence a protocol outcome, but one
has an upper bound on what they can do. For example, in the case of QKD,
one would ideally construct a secret key resource K that at most allows the
10
Secret key K
Alice Bob
Eve
key
k,⊥ k,⊥
0, 1
Figure 4 – A secret key resource that allows Eve to decide if Alice and Bob
get a uniform key or an error message.10
adversary, Eve, to decide if the players get a key or not,9 but not get any
information about the value of the key, as drawn in Figure 4.10
In reality, Eve might have less power than this, e.g., she decides that
the players should get the key, but the protocol aborts nonetheless. This, of
course, is also an acceptable resource to construct, since it is stronger than
K— it is stronger (for the honest players), because Eve has less influence
over the outputs. More precisely, any resource KσE is an acceptable ideal
resource for QKD, since anything achieved by it can be achieved by K if Eve
decides to run σE at her interface. A specification of an ideal key resource
that (at most) allows Eve to provoke an abort is thus given by
K
∗ := {KσE : σ ∈ Σ}.
We are now ready to define the notion of construction in the special case
of three party protocols with honest Alice and Bob and dishonest Eve.
Definition 2.1 (Cryptographic security [3,4]). We say that a protocol π =
(πA, πB) constructs a resource specification S from the specification R with
error ε, which we denote
R
π,ε−−→ S,
if
πBπAR ⊂ (S∗)ε. (4)
One will often want to make several statements about a protocol, e.g.,
R
π,ε−−→ S and R π,ε
′
−−→ S, where R and S might be the resources in case of
an active adversary (e.g., Eve can arbitrarily modify the communication
9Ideally one would want Eve to not even have the possibility of preventing the play-
ers from getting the key. But this cannot be achieved, since Eve can always cut the
communication in the real system.
10To preserve a sequential execution of the systems, the key resource is defined so
that upon inputing her bit, Eve receives a confirmation from K. The players may then
individually send a request to the resource, and get either their key or an error. To simplify
the picture, only the actual information transmitted is drawn in Figure 4. Request and
confirmation arrows have been omitted.
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between Alice and Bob), and R and S are resources in case no adversary is
present (e.g., there is only non-malicious noise on the channels). One then
typically has R ⊂ R∗ and S ⊂ S∗, i.e., if we can say something more specific
about the resources available (e.g., specific noise model), then we can make
strong statements about the constructed resource (e.g., a key is produced
with probability 1− ε).
Note that in order to prove that Definition 2.1 is satisfied by a protocol
π, it is sufficient to prove that for every R ∈ R there exists an S ∈ S and
σ ∈ Σ such that
d(πBπAR,SσE) ≤ ε, (5)
since this implies that Eq. (4) holds. The exact σE used in the security proof
will be called simulator. In the following, we often write R ≈ε S instead of
d(R,S) ≤ ε, e.g., Eq. (5) becomes
πBπAR ≈ε SσE.
We now prove that this definition of construction is composable— i.e.,
Eqs. (2) and (3) are satisfied—with the error of the composed construction
that is the sum of the errors of the parts.
Theorem 2.2. If the pseudo-metric d : Φ× Φ→ R+ is contractive, then
R
γ,ε−−→ S and S π,δ−−→ T =⇒ R π◦γ,ε+δ−−−−−→ T.
If, additionally, d is context-insensitive, then
R1
γ1,ε1−−−→ S1 and R2 γ2,ε2−−−→ S2 =⇒ R1‖R2 γ1|γ2,ε1+ε2−−−−−−−→ S1‖S2.
Proof. Using the properties of converters and ε-balls from Sections 2.2 and
2.3, one has
πγR ⊂ π(S∗)ε ⊂ (πS∗)ε ⊂
((
(T∗)δ
)∗)ε
⊂
(
((T∗)∗)δ
)ε
⊂ (T∗)ε+δ.
Additionally using the properties of parallel composition from Section 2.4,
one has
(γ1|γ2)(R1‖R2) = (γ1R1)‖(γ2R2) ⊂ (S∗1)ε1‖(S∗2)ε2
⊂ (S∗1‖S∗2)ε1+ε2 ⊂ ((S1‖S2)∗)ε1+ε2 .
2.6 Atomic resources
So far we have instantiated the AC framework with specifications defined
as sets of atomic resources. To model concrete systems (such as those from
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4), we need to instantiate these atomic resources with a model
of interactive systems that captures quantum information-processing. Such
12
a model has been given in [26], where the atomic resources are called causal
boxes, and proven to satisfy the properties required by the AC framework.
The causal box framework [26] allows superpositions of causal structures
to be modeled, e.g., messages can be sent in superpositions of different orders
to superpositions of different players. In order for this to be possible, one
has to model messages as pairs |v, t〉 ∈ HV ⊗HT , where v denotes the value
being sent and t can be understood as a time tag that controls the ordering
of messages. This then allows superpositions of different values at different
times (or different orders), e.g.,
|ψ〉 = |v1, t1〉+ |v2, t2〉.
Most of the results in the current paper consider simpler resources, that
use (classical) sequential scheduling, i.e, they receive a message, send a mes-
sage, receive another message, etc. This is the case of all the examples seen
so far in this section. These can be modeled as memory channels or quantum
combs [27–29] (see also [30–32]), i.e., systems with some internal memoryM ,
and which upon receiving an input in some register Xi produce a single out-
put in some register Yi by applying a map Ei : L(HXiM )→ L(HMYi) which
updates the internal memory and computes the output. Such systems can
be seen as special cases of causal boxes, in which the (unnecessary) time tag
is not written out explicitly.
These two models of quantum information-processing systems— quan-
tum combs and causal boxes— are introduced in detail in Appendix B. In
the following we model all systems as quantum combs, unless stated other-
wise.
Regardless of the instantiation, the distance between two atomic re-
sources R and S is taken to be the distinguishing advantage, i.e., a dis-
tinguisher D interacts with one of the two and has to guess which one it is
given. The distinguishing advantage is then defined as
d(R,S) := sup
D
|Pr[D(R) = 1]− Pr[D(S) = 1]|,
whereD(R) is the binary random variable corresponding to the distinguisher’s
guess when interacting with R. In the case of quantum combs the distin-
guishing advantage corresponds to the trace distance between the two states
held in memory by the distinguisher after interacting with the corresponding
systems [28,29]. A similar result is derived for causal boxes [26].
3 Min-entropy resources
Before modeling min-entropy specifications, we first consider min-entropy
atomic resources using both the quantum combs [27–29] and causal boxes [26]
models, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. We then define min-entropy
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Hn
S
start X
E
Figure 5 – Hn is a (k, δ)-min-entropy comb if for all S the state ρXE satisfies
the conditions from Definition 3.1.
specifications in Section 3.3, and discuss ε-balls around min-entropy specifi-
cations in Section 3.4.
The quantum notation and concepts used in this section and the fol-
lowing are introduced in Appendix A. The models of quantum combs and
causal boxes are explained in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2, respectively.
3.1 Finite dimensional systems
Quantum combs [27–29], by definition, can only interact a finite number of
times with their environment, since they are modeled by (the Choi-Jami-
o lkowski representation of) a finite dimensional completely positive, trace-
preserving (CPTP) map (see Appendix B.1). This is sufficient to model
any min-entropy resource that generates the output X after a fixed number
of rounds of interaction (as is the case for the applications to QKD and
authentication considered in this work), or if the systems have a timeout
after which they abort— since in a finite amount of time a causal system
can only send a finite number of messages [26].
To model min-entropy atomic resources with combs, we consider a sys-
tem Hn that is activated by receiving a fixed symbol “start”. It then outputs
a quantum message, receives a quantum message as input, outputs another
message, etc., until a total of n messages have been exchanged with its en-
vironment. It then finally outputs a classical (random) value X from an
alphabet X ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is an error symbol denoting that the system
failed to generate an output (with enough entropy). Such a system is il-
lustrated in Figure 5, and is a called a min-entropy comb if it satisfies the
following conditions.
Definition 3.1 (Min-entropy comb). Let Hn be a quantum comb with a
structure as described above, and let S be any comb that mirrors it: S
first receives a quantum message, then outputs one, etc, for a total of n
interactions, and finally outputs a quantum system E. We say that Hn is a
(k, δ)-min-entropy comb if for all S, the final joint state ρXE is given by
ρXE = |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ τE + σXE (6)
14
for an arbitrary state τE, and a state σXE satisfying
Hδmin(X|E)σ ≥ k, (7)
where Hδmin(X|E)σ denotes the δ-smooth conditional min-entropy of σXE
and is defined in Appendix A.3, Definition A.3.
Note that the min-entropy condition in Eq. (7), is defined on the sub-
normalized state σXE . This is because the min-entropy of the renormalized
state σXE/ tr(σXE) is not meaningful when the probability of not aborting,
tr(σXE), is very small— one does not care what happens conditioned on
an unlikely event. For a state σXE with tr(σXE) ≤ 2−k + δ2/2, Eq. (7) is
trivially satisfied.
3.2 Unbounded interactions
The systems defined in Section 3.1 have a fixed number of interactions
(namely n) with the environment. This is necessary if one wants to keep
the joint input and output Hilbert spaces finite dimensional. One can how-
ever imagine more general systems where the number of interactions is a
priori unbounded and depends on the values that are input— or where the
number of interactions is in a superposition of different values. We model
this using causal boxes [26].
As explained in Appendix B.2, in the causal box model a message can
be thought of as a pair of a value v ∈ V and a position t ∈ T , where T is a
discrete partially ordered set allowing messages to be ordered with respect to
each other (e.g., T = Q). Let HX = HV ⊗HT be the corresponding Hilbert
space. An output of a causal box may consist in one message, multiple mes-
sages, no messages at all, or any superposition thereof. The corresponding
message space is a Fock space given by
F(HX) :=
∞⊕
n=0
∨nHX ,
where ∨nHX denotes the symmetric subspace of H⊗nX , and H⊗0X is the one
dimensional space containing the vacuum state |Ω〉.
Thus, a figure drawing a causal box does not have one arrow for every
output, but instead one arrow for an output wire that many produce an
unbounded number of messages. For example, in Figure 6, the two causal
boxes H and S are connected by two wires, and may be repeatedly exchanging
messages on these wires— these systems are not required to terminate.11
11Formally, causal boxes are modeled as sequences of maps over ever increasing intervals
of T , see Appendix B.2.
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HS
start X
E
Figure 6 – In the model of causal boxes, each wire may be used an unbounded
number of times to transmit messages, e.g., there is no bound on the number
of rounds of communication between H and S. The system H is a (k, δ)-min-
entropy causal box if for all S and all t the state ρ≤tXE satisfies the conditions
from Definition 3.2, where ρ≤tXE is the state of the XE systems truncated at
position t.
Similar to the model of min-entropy combs, we model a min-entropy
causal box as being started by receiving a corresponding message,12 after
which it interacts with an environment (e.g., the system S drawn in Figure 6).
At any point during this interaction, it may output a value on the wire X
from the alphabet X ∪{⊥}, where, as above, ⊥ is an error symbol denoting
that the system failed to generate an output (with enough entropy). But
we restrict the output on X to the subspace H⊗0X ⊕ H⊗1X , i.e., at most one
value is output. Unlike for combs, we cannot place a requirement on the
entropy of X once a value is output, since this condition might not be well-
defined (e.g., for t ∈ N, a value is produced in position t with probability
2−t). Instead, we bound the entropy of the output up to position t for all
t ∈ T .
Definition 3.2 (Min-entropy causal box). Let H be a causal box with a
structure as described above, and let S be any causal box with an input and
output wire that match the dimensions of the output and input wires of H,
and with an additional output wire E, and let them be connected by these
wires. Furthermore, for V T = X, let ρ≤tV TE be the subnormalized output
on XE up to position t projected on the non-vacuum subspace HV ⊗HT ⊗
F(HE). We say that H is a (k, δ)-min-entropy causal box if for all S and all
t ∈ T , the state ρ≤tV TE is given by
ρ≤tV TE = |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ τTE + σV TE
for an arbitrary state τTE, and a state σV TE satisfying
Hδmin(V |TE)σ ≥ k.
Note that Definition 3.2 conditions the entropy of the output on the
register T as well as E, since this ordering information could be learned
12Technically this is not necessary, a causal box may spontaneously output a message.
But it simplifies the scheduling with other systems to consider only causal boxes that are
started by an external message.
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by an adversary. Though if one considers only systems where timing is
independent of the values of messages, then it would be sufficient to bound
Hδmin(V |E)σ .
3.3 Min-entropy specification
For min-entropy combs and causal boxes (defined in the previous two sec-
tions) to be valid atomic resources, one still has to assign interfaces to the
various inputs and outputs. In a model with two interfaces A and E—ac-
cessed by Alice and Eve, respectively— the final output X occurs at Alice’s
interface, and the interaction with the environment occurs at Eve’s inter-
face. The input “start” may be provided at either Alice or Eve’s interface,
depending on the protocol considered. A min-entropy specification is then
simply the set of all min-entropy atomic resources satisfying a certain bound
on the conditional min-entropy.
Definition 3.3 (Min-entropy specification). A (k, δ)-min-entropy specifica-
tion Hk,δmin is the set of all (k, δ)-min-entropy atomic resources.
Definition 3.3 is typically the min-entropy specification one would con-
struct in an adversarial setting: it provides a bound on the entropy, but
not on the actual probability of terminating which such a random string,
since usually Eve can force honest players to abort. If one considers a con-
text where Eve is not active, then one generally wishes to prove something
stronger, e.g., with high probability the protocol generates a random string.
Such a statement can easily be achieved by restricting the setHk,δmin to contain
only those systems such that for all S, the output ρXE = |⊥〉〈⊥|⊗ τE +σXE
has tr(σXE) ≥ 1− ε.13
In the two applications considered in this work, we need min-entropy
resources with three interfaces for Alice, Bob, and Eve. These are defined
identically to the two interface versions described so far, except that a string
Y is output at Bob’s interface as well.14 Here, the conditional min-entropy is
always defined on the XE system. The allowed correlations between Y and
XE will depend on the context, e.g., the min-entropy resource constructed
by QKD allows Y to be an arbitrary random string, whereas the min-entropy
resource used as a secret key by the Fehr-Salvail protocol requires Y to be
a copy of X.
13In the model with causal boxes, one would require that by a certain position t0,
tr(σ≤t0XE ) ≥ 1− ε.
14As in the examples of systems in Section 2, to preserve sequential scheduling when
the atomic resources are instantiated with quantum combs, the outputs X and Y are not
produced spontaneously, but only after having received a request from Alice and Bob,
respectively.
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3.4 Approximate min-entropy specifications
In Section 2.3 we defined a notion of an approximate specification, directly in
the AC language, by taking an ε-ball around specifications. The min-entropy
resources defined in Section 3.3 have their own notion of approximation built-
in, namely the smoothing parameter δ. This is useful, because (as we prove
in the next lemma) δ-smoothing is a less specific condition that results in a
larger set of atomic resources than ε-balls.15 It remains open to find bounds
in the other direction— i.e., whetherHk,δ+εmin ⊂
(
H
k,δ
min
)ε′
for some reasonable
ε′—or examples showing that such bounds do not exist.
Lemma 3.4. For min-entropy specifications one has(
H
k,δ
min
)ε
⊂ Hk,δ+
√
2ε
min .
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose there exists an H such that
H /∈ Hk,δ+
√
2ε
min , (8)
but
H ∈
(
H
k,δ
min
)ε
. (9)
From Eq. (8) we find that there must exist an S such that the state ρXE =
|⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ τE + σXE resulting from S and H interacting has
Hδ+
√
2ε
min (X|E)σ < k. (10)
From Eq. (9) there must exist an H′ ≈ε H such that when interacting with
the same S, the resulting state ρ′XE = |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ τ ′XE + σ′XE has
Hδmin(X|E)σ′ ≥ k. (11)
Since H′ ≈ε H, it follows that D(ρ′XE, ρXE) ≤ ε, where D(·, ·) is the
trace distance. One then obtains
D(ρ′XE , ρXE) =
1
2
∥∥σ′XE − σXE∥∥tr + 12
∥∥τ ′E − τE∥∥tr
≥ 1
2
∥∥σ′XE − σXE∥∥tr + 12
∣∣tr τ ′E − tr τE∣∣
= D¯(σ′XE , σXE)
≥ P (σ′XE , σXE)2/2,
where D¯(·, ·) is the generalized trace distance and P (·, ·) is the purified dis-
tance (see Appendix A.2 and [33]).
Putting this together with Eq. (11) and the triangle inequality, there
must exist a σ˜XE such that Hmin(X|E)σ˜ ≥ k and P (σ˜XE , σXE) ≤ δ +
√
2ε,
which contradicts Eq. (10).
15It is currently unknown if it is possible to prove that a QKD protocol constructs the
smaller set of resources without the smoothing parameter.
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4 Distilling Secret Key
In this section we show how to extract secret key from a tripartite min-
entropy resource, where Alice and Bob obtain strings X and Y , and Eve
gets side information. In Section 4.1 we show how error correction and
verification construct a min-entropy resource which provides Alice and Bob
with identical strings X ′ = Y ′, given a resource that has no guarantee on
the correlations between X and Y . Then in Section 4.2 the players use
privacy amplification to construct a secret key resource (see Figure 4 for
an illustration of a secret key resource). The two steps are composed in
Section 4.3.
These steps of error correction and privacy amplification are performed
in a generic way for any resource that satisfies the min-entropy specification.
We show in Appendix C that QKD is a special case of this, which constructs
a (more specific) min-entropy resource.
4.1 Error Correction
In this section we analyze a generic class of error correction schemes, which
are now standard in QKD (see, e.g., [12,14]). The error correction procedure
has two steps. In the first, Alice applies a function Z = synd(X) which
computes a syndrome for X. She then sends this on an authentic channel to
Bob, who applies the second function Xˆ = corr(Y,Z) to get an estimate Xˆ
of Alice’s string X. Such pairs of functions (synd, corr) are parametrized by
two values: by a subset S ⊂ X × X of strings that they can correct, i.e, for
all (x, y) ∈ S, corr(y, synd(x)) = x, and by the length of the string |Z| = r,
which bounds how much information is leaked to the adversary about X.
Let πcorr denote the first part of the procedure.
In the second step, the players verify whether the error correction was
successful. They do this by first choosing a function f uniformly at random
from a family of almost universal hash functions, i.e., a set F = {f : X → Y}
such that for all x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′,
Pr
f∈F
[
f(x) = f(x′)
] ≤ εverif. (12)
Alice sends (f, f(X)) to Bob, who verifies that f(X) = f(Xˆ), and tells Alice
whether this is successful or whether they should abort. Let the length of
the hash be |f(x)| = t, i.e., |Y| = 2t. Let πverif denote the second part of this
procedure. The complete error correction scheme is then πec = πverif ◦ πcorr.
There are now two cases to consider. The first is when the players
have absolutely no guarantee about the correlations between X and Y —
in QKD, this is the case if an adversary is eavesdropping on the channel
and can arbitrarily change the quantum messages. In this case, we wish to
bound the information Eve has as well as bound the probability that the
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honest players end up with different strings. The second case is when some
bounds on the correlations between X and Y are known (e.g., the number of
bit flips between the two)— in QKD, this is the case if only natural noise is
present on the channel. If such a more specific resource is present, we then
wish to prove that a more specific (stronger) resource is constructed, namely,
we additionally want a bound on the probability that the players abort—
which is known as the robustness (to this noise model) of a protocol.
4.1.1 Security
We start with the first case, when Alice and Bob share a resource H
k,δ
min,
where Bob’s string Y may be arbitrary (but is always ⊥ if Alice’s is ⊥). Fur-
thermore, they share an authentic channel Ac.16 It is straightforward that
without any further information about Y one has no hope of guaranteeing
that πcorr will work. Instead, we just bound the information leaked to the
adversary by this procedure.
Lemma 4.1. πcorr leaks at most r bits of information about Alice’s string
X to Eve, i.e.,
H
k,δ
min‖Ac
πcorr,0−−−−→ Hk−r,δmin .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma D.1.
In this case, the crucial part of the error correction procedure is the error
verification, which constructs a min-entropy resource that provides Bob with
a perfect copy of Alice’s string (or aborts).
Theorem 4.2. Let H
k,δ
min denote a (k, δ)-min-entropy resource, where Bob’s
string Y is arbitrary (but is always ⊥ if Alice’s is ⊥), and Hk,δmin denote a
(k, δ)-min-entropy resource in which Bob has an exact copy of Alice’s string.
Then
H
k,δ
min‖Ac
πverif,εverif−−−−−−→ Hk−t,δmin .
Note that one has Hk,δmin ⊂ H
k,δ
min. What π
verif does is check if the resource
shared by Alice and Bob belongs to Hk,δmin, and aborts if not. It leaks t bits
in the process and fails with probability εverif.
Proof. Let H ∈ Hk,δmin and define H′ to work as follows. H′ internally runs H.
If it obtains X = ⊥, it simply outputs ⊥ at both Alice and Bob’s interfaces
when requested. If X 6= ⊥, it prepares (f, f(X)) for a uniformly chosen f to
be output at Eve’s interface as information sent on the authentic channel if
requested. It checks whether f(X) = f(Y ), and prepares the corresponding
bit of backwards information to be output at Eve’s interface if requested. If
16See the description of the multiple use authentic channel Ac in Section 2.4 and
Footnote 7 (though in this case, a single use channel is sufficient).
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these strings are equal, H′ now outputs X ′ = Y ′ = X at Alice’s and Bob’s
interfaces when requested. If they are different, it outputs X ′ = Y ′ = ⊥.
To prove that this theorem holds, we will show that
πverifH
k,δ
min ⊂
(
H
k−t,δ
min
)εverif
.
This statement follows if we can show that H′ ∈ Hk−t,δmin and that πverifH ≈εverif
H′. Note that πverifH and H′ behave identically, except for the string Y ′ out-
put at Bob’s interface, which, in the case of H′ is always Y ′ = X ′, whereas
in the real setting one might have Y ′ 6= X ′. A bound on the probability that
Y ′ 6= X ′ is thus a bound on the distinguishability between the two systems;
and it follows from the almost universal hashing property (Eq. (12)) that
Pr[Y ′ 6= X ′] ≤ εverif.
To prove that H′ ∈ Hk−t,δmin we need to show that for all S interacting
with H′, the resulting state is of the from ρX′Y ′E′ = |⊥,⊥〉〈⊥,⊥| ⊗ τE′ +
σX′Y ′E′ with X
′ = Y ′ and Hδmin(X
′|E′)σ ≥ k − t. By construction we
always have X ′ = Y ′, so the only condition to verify is the min-entropy
bound. The last messages output by H′ at Eve’s interface are f , f(X), and
the decision bit f(X) = f(Y ). We denote these registers by F , Z, and Ω.
It is sufficient to consider a system S that interacts with H, and together
with the output in register E also outputs FZΩ, hence E′ = EFZΩ. By
definition of H, the state ρXY EFZΩ resulting from S interacting with H and
adding the transcript FZΩ that is produced at Eve’s interface has the form
ρXY EFZΩ = |⊥,⊥〉〈⊥,⊥|⊗ τEFZΩ+ γXYEFZΩ with Hδmin(X|E)γ ≥ k. From
Lemma D.1 one has Hδmin(X|EFZ)γ ≥ k − t. Furthermore, γXY EFZΩ =
γ0XY EFZ ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ γ1XY EFZ ⊗ |1〉〈1|, and σX′Y ′E′ = γ1XY EFZ ⊗ |1〉〈1|. It then
follows from Lemma D.2 that Hδmin(X
′|E′)σ ≥ k − t.
Corollary 4.3. πec = πverif ◦ πcorr constructs Hk−r−t,δmin from H
k,δ
min and A
c
with error εverif,
H
k,δ
min‖Ac
πec,εverif−−−−−→ Hk−r−t,δmin ,
where Ac = Ac1‖Ac2 , and Ac1 and Ac2 are used by πcorr and πverif, respec-
tively.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.1, Theorem 4.2, and Theorem 2.2.
4.1.2 Robustness
We now consider the case where correlations between X and Y are known.
The procedure πcorr must be chosen to deal specifically with these errors. Let
R
k,δ,p
min ⊂ H
k,δ
min be a min-entropy specification that is restricted to resources
that only abort with probability at most p and furthermore, that do not allow
arbitrary outputs Y , but only strings such that (X,Y ) ⊂ S, where S is the
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set of pairs that can be corrected. And let Rk,δ,pmin ⊂ Hk,δmin be a specification of
resources that also abort with probability at most p and produce identical
strings at Alice’s and Bob’s interfaces. It is straightforward that in this
case the procedure πec constructs Rk,δ,pmin from R
k−r−t,δ,p
min , i.e., one can make
statements about the probability that the protocol aborts.
Lemma 4.4. Let πec, R
k,δ,p
min , and R
k,δ,p
min be as described above. Then
R
k,δ,p
min ‖Ac
πec,0−−−→ Rk−r−t,δ,pmin .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma D.1, and the properties of the error correc-
tion code chosen.
Note that if (X,Y ) ⊂ S only holds with probability 1− ε, then one does
not have the resource R
k,δ,p
min , but a less specific resource
(
R
k,δ,p
min
)ε
, and using
the fact that for any S, Sε
id,ε−−→ S, and Theorem 2.2, one has(
R
k,δ,p
min
)ε
‖Ac π
ec,ε−−−→ Rk−r−t,δ,pmin .
4.2 Privacy Amplification
After the error correction scheme, the players share a string that is partially
known to the adversary. To obtain a secret string, Alice picks a string Z
uniformly at random, a seed, and sends it to Bob on an authentic channel.
They then each compute the strings K = Ext(X,Z) and K ′ = Ext(Y,Z)
for some predefined function Ext, known as an extractor. This procedure is
called privacy amplification [34, 35], and we denote the corresponding pair
of converters as πpa. The function Ext has to satisfy the following property.
Definition 4.5. A function Ext : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a quantum-
proof (k, ε)-strong extractor for subnormalized states if for any subnormal-
ized state ρXE classical on X, with Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k, and a uniform Z, we
have
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Z)ZE − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε,
where τK is the fully mixed state.
The more standard definition for quantum-proof extractors only requires
them to be defined for normalized states. But as shown in Lemma D.3, any
extractor for normalized states is also an extractor for subnormalized states
with slightly weaker parameters. Efficient constructions of extractors are
given in, e.g., [35–39]. Note that some of these, e.g., the universal hashing
extractors [35,37,38], directly satisfy Definition 4.5.
We are now ready to state the main theorem for this section.
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k,⊥ k,⊥
σE
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Figure 7 – An m-bit secret key resource Km connected to a simulator σE at
Eve’s interface. As in Section 2.5, Km does not spontaneously output the keys
at the players’ interfaces, but only after having received a request, which is
omitted from the drawing.
Theorem 4.6. Let πpa be a privacy amplification protocol as described
above, which uses a quantum-proof (k, εpa)-strong extractor for subnormal-
ized states. Given a (k, δ)-min-entropy resource Hk,δmin which provides Alice
and Bob with identical strings X = Y , and an authentic channel Ac, πpa con-
structs am m-bit secret key resource Km (see Figure 7) with error εpa + 2δ,
H
k,δ
min‖Ac
πpa,εpa+2δ−−−−−−−→ Km.
Unlike previous proofs, the current one requires a simulator, σE , which
we draw in Figure 7. Note that the number of messages exchanged at the
outer interface of σE (i.e., the number of arrows in Figure 7) will depend on
the atomic resource R ∈ πpa(Hk,δmin‖Ac) from the real system. For example,
in the case of a min-entropy resource constructed using a QKD protocol,
this would be three messages as drawn in Figure 7: the quantum states
generated by Alice are output at Eve’s interface, the modified states are
then input by Eve, and finally a transcript of the classical communication
is given to Eve as well (upon request).
Proof. To prove that πpa(Hk,δmin‖Ac) ⊂ ((Km)∗)εpa , for every atomic resource
πpa(H‖A) ∈ πpa(Hk,δmin‖Ac) we will find a K and σE such that πpa(H‖A) ≈εpa
KσE . Since A
c and Km both have cardinality 1, we only need to find a
simulator σE for every H. We construct σE as follows. σE runs H internally
and generates all the communication at the outer interface. If H outputs ⊥,
σE notifies the key resource K to output an error ⊥ as well. If H outputs a
string X 6= ⊥, then it picks a random seed Z, which is made available to be
output at its outer interface as the transcript on the authentic channel. It
notifies K to generate a uniform key k, which is output at Alice’s and Bob’s
interfaces when requested.
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Let a distinguisher interact with the real system. After interacting with
H it gets a system E, then obtains Z and finally an output K from Alice’s
and Bob’s interface. We take Z = ⊥ in case H generated a string X = ⊥.
The distinguisher then holds the state
ρKZE = |⊥,⊥〉〈⊥,⊥| ⊗ ρ⊥E + ρ⊤Ext(X,Z)ZE.
In the case where the distinguisher is interacting with KσE, it is going to
get the state
ρ˜KZE = |⊥,⊥〉〈⊥,⊥| ⊗ ρ⊥E + τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρ⊤E .
The distinguishability between the two systems is bounded by the trace
distance between ρKZE and ρ˜KZE, namely
1
2
‖ρKZE − ρ˜KZE‖tr =
1
2
∥∥∥ρ⊤Ext(X,Z)ZE − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρ⊤E∥∥∥
tr
≤ εpa + 2δ,
where the last inequality uses the fact that Hδmin(X|E)ρ⊤ ≥ k, that Ext
is a quantum-proof (k, εpa)-strong extractor for subnormalized states and
Lemma D.4, which shows that a (k, ε)-extractor has error ε + 2δ if used
on states with a bound on their smooth min-entropy instead of their min-
entropy.
4.3 Composed statement
By composing Corollary 4.3, Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.6, we get the fol-
lowing.
Corollary 4.7. Let H
k,δ
min be a (k, δ)-min-entropy resource that produces an
arbitrary output at Bob’s interface, let R
k,δ
min ⊂ H
k,δ
min be a (k, δ)-min-entropy
resource that never aborts and furthermore, produces strings (X,Y ) ⊂ S
that are always corrected by the functions (synd, corr). Let Km be a secret
key resource that always provides the players with a uniform key of length m
and let Km be a secret key resource that only provides a key if the adversary
allows it. Finally, let π = πpa ◦ πec be the construction described in this
section. Then
R
k,δ
min‖Ac
π,εpa+2δ−−−−−→ Km
and
H
k,δ
min‖Ac
π,εverif+εpa+2δ−−−−−−−−−→ Km,
where Ac = Ac1‖Ac2 , and Aci are the authentic channels used by the different
parts of the protocol.
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5 Quantum Authentication of Classical Messages
Fehr and Salvail [19, 20] propose a prepare-and-measure protocol that au-
thenticates a classical message by encoding it into a quantum cipher. The
main feature of their protocol is that it recycles all the key if the message is
accepted by the receiver. In this section we provide a composable security
analysis of a slightly modified version of their protocol, which is adapted
from [20]. We first provide a high level view of what the protocol achieves
in the AC framework in Section 5.1. Then in Section 5.2 we give the details
of the protocol. The security proof is provided in Section 5.3. And finally,
in Section 5.4 we prove bounds on the security if the compromised key is
replaced instead of being discarded.
5.1 The Construction
In this section we model the Fehr-Salvail protocol as a pair of converters
π = (πA, πB) that construct some resource S given some other resource R.
As in Section 4, there are two statements we wish to make. The first is
when an adversary is present and the players share an insecure quantum
channel Q as drawn in Figure 8a, i.e., the adversary can change the message
being sent and insert a message of her own. We model the real and ideal
systems for this case in Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2, respectively. The
second setting is when no adversary is present, but the channel shared has
some natural noise, as in Figure 8b. This case is discussed in Section 5.1.3.
5.1.1 Real System
The protocol π = (πA, πB) has a very simple structure. First πA encodes a
classical message in a quantum cipher and sends it to Bob on the insecure
channel Q. πB decodes, and either accepts or rejects the message. It also
recycles some key depending on the decision. πB then sends one bit of
information back to Alice, to notify her of whether the message was accepted
or rejected, after which πA recycles Alice’s keys.
To send this bit of information to Alice, we assume that the players
share a backward authentic channel A1. As in Section 4, this is defined as
a channel that always transmits the message, but provides a copy to Eve if
she requests it. This is illustrated in Figure 8c (but to simplify the drawing,
we do not draw the request that Eve must make to get the transcript of the
authentic channel).
The final resources the players are going to need are the key resources.
The protocol uses three keys, (ℓss, ℓmac, θ). ℓss and ℓmac need to be uniform,
so we provide Alice and Bob with a shared uniform key resource K, as
depicted in Figure 4, which generates these keys. Note that if Eve does
not allow the players to get a key, they cannot run the protocol, and it is
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Insecure channel Q
Alice Bob
Eve
ρ ρ′
(a) An insecure channel from Alice
(on the left) to Bob (on the right)
allows Eve (below) to intercept the
message and insert a message of her
own.
Noisy channel Rεϕ
Alice Bob
Eve
ρ Eϕ(ρ)
(b)When no adversary is present, Al-
ice’s message is delivered to Bob, but
some natural noise is inserted.
Authentic channel A
Alice Bob
Eve
x x
(c) An idealized authentic channel
from Alice to Bob allows Eve to re-
ceive a copy of the message, but guar-
antees that Bob always gets it.
Authentic channel A
Alice Bob
Eve
x x,⊥
0, 1
(d) A realistic authentic channel
from Alice to Bob allows Eve to
receive a copy of the message and
choose whether Bob receives it or an
error symbol.
Figure 8 – Some resources needed in the Fehr-Salvail construction.
trivially secure. Thus, in the following, we assume the switch is set by Eve
to provide the players with a key.
The key θ does not need to be uniform, it is sufficient if it has bounded
min-entropy. So we provide the players with a (k, 0)-min-entropy resource
H
k,0
min as defined in Section 3.3. Since we always take the smoothing param-
eter to be 0 in this section, we denote this resource by Hkmin. Note that
to satisfy sequential scheduling, both the key resources K and Hkmin only
provide the keys (or error messages) to the players when they request them
(see Remark B.1, and the discussion of these resources in Sections 2.5 and
3.3).
Putting this together, we get the real system drawn in Figure 9a. (The
switch on K as well as the requests to get keys and messages have been
omitted from the picture.)
5.1.2 Ideal system
The goal of the protocol is to construct an authentic channel. But the
channel A depicted in Figure 8c always delivers the message, and this cannot
be achieved, since Eve can jumble the communication if desired. What is
achieved is a slightly weaker resource A, which allows Eve to choose if Bob
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πA πBSecret key K
ℓ ℓ
key
ℓ ℓ
Min-entropy resource Hkmin
θ,⊥ θ,⊥θ θ
Auth. ch. A1
Insecure ch. Q
m m
′,⊥
(a) The real system consists of the resources consumed and the honest players
converters (πA, πB) that run the protocol.
simE
Secret key K
key
ℓ ℓ
Min-entropy resource Hkmin
θ,⊥ θ,⊥
Authentic ch. A
m m,⊥
(b) The ideal system consists of the constructed resources and the simulator
simE .
Figure 9 – The real and ideal systems of the modified FS protocol in the case
where Eve is present.
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gets the message or not— here too, the receiver must request the message
for it to be output, it is not spontaneously output when Eve allows it. This
is illustrated in Figure 8d without the request arrow for the message to be
delivered.
The protocol also recycles keys, which is modeled as key resources in
the ideal system. All the uniform key (ℓss, ℓmac) is recycled, so the ideal
system must have a resource K as well, which provides the players with
fresh uniform keys (independent of the messages and ciphers obtained by
Eve).
As we show in Theorem 5.4 in Section 5.3, the subnormalized key with
distribution PΘ′(θ) := Pr[Θ = θ and “accept”] that is output by players the
if the message is accepted has the same min-entropy as the original nor-
malized key Θ. So the recycled key in the ideal system is captured by a
specification Hkmin with the same entropy bound k. Note that the renormal-
ized key with distribution PΘ′(θ) := Pr[Θ = θ|“accept”] may have much less
entropy, so there is effectively an entropy loss during the protocol. But the
relevant measure of entropy for future uses of the key is that of the subnor-
malized state— since the resource consumed, Hkmin, measures the entropy
of the subnormalized state.
Putting this together along with a simulator simE that is needed for the
security proof, we get the ideal system drawn in Figure 9b.
The corresponding constructive statement formulated in the AC frame-
work is that π constructs K‖Hkmin‖A from K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Q (with some error
εadv),
K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Q
π,εadv−−−−→ K‖Hkmin‖A. (13)
The key resources K and Hkmin may be seen as catalysts, since they appear
both in the real and ideal systems.
5.1.3 Natural Noise
In the case where Eve is not present, the players share a channel that has
natural noise instead of the insecure channel Q. More specifically, the pro-
tocol is designed to correct ϕ errors, so we assume a channel specification
that is ε-close to having ϕ errors when the states sent are encoded as in the
protocol.17 We denote this channel specification by Rεϕ, and illustrate this
in Figure 8b.
Furthermore, in this case we wish to make a stronger statement, namely
that the message is delivered for sure, i.e., a channel of the type A from
17We model the channel as only adding noise to the quantum states sent, but assume
that the classical part of the cipher is transmitted without errors. One can easily compose
a noisy classical channel with converters that perform error correction if this is not the
case (see Figure 2), i.e., construct a noiseless channel from a noisy one. We do not want
to do this for a quantum channel, because quantum error correcting codes are not prepare-
and-measure.
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Figure 8c is constructed. But to achieve this, it is not sufficient that the
communication is not jumble by Eve, we also need to be sure that the
players always get keys. We denote by K and Hkmin resources which always
provide keys to the players. In this case, the recycled keys are of the same
type.
The corresponding constructive statement is that π constructsK‖Hkmin‖A
from K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Rεϕ (with some error εnoise),
K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Rεϕ
π,εnoise−−−−→ K‖Hkmin‖A. (14)
5.2 Protocol
The Fehr-Salvail [19] protocol requires two different (keyed) hash functions,
which we denote ss : {0, 1}nss × {0, 1}rss → {0, 1}mss and mac : {0, 1}nmac ×
{0, 1}rmac → {0, 1}mmac . Both of these functions are constructed from extrac-
tors18 Exth : {0, 1}nh ×{0, 1}rh−mh → {0, 1}mh , for h ∈ {ss,mac}. The hash
functions are defined as h(x, ℓ1‖ℓ2) := Exth(x, ℓ1)⊕ ℓ2.
Note that not any extractor will do. They have to be quantum-proof
(k, ε)-strong extractors for subnormalized states for any value k and an error
ε = νh2
√
2−k+mh , where νh are parameters specific to each extractor. Univer-
sal hashing [35], almost universal hashing [37], dual universal hashing [38],
as well as δ-biased masking [36] all satisfy this requirement (for parameters
νh which depend on the specific constructions). To obtain composable secu-
rity, we additionally require that these extractors be linear functions in the
first input [20], which is satisfied by all the constructions cited above.
The reason for this specific form of extractor is that the security proof
requires the following property.
Definition 5.1 (ν-key-privacy [19]). A function h : X × L → T offers ν-
key-privacy if for any subnormalized state ρLXTE ∈ S≤(HLXTE) with the
properties ρLX = τL⊗ρX , T = h(X,L), and L↔ XT ↔ E forms a Markov
chain, it holds that
‖ρLTE − τL ⊗ ρTE‖tr ≤ ν
√
2−Hmin(X|TE)+m,
where τL is the fully mixed state and T = {0, 1}m.
Fehr and Salvail [19] prove that if Exth is an extractor of the type
given above, then the corresponding function h provides νh-key-privacy (see
Lemma D.6).
Note that a function like h obtained by XORing a uniform key always
produces a uniform output.
18The definition of an extractor is given in Definition 4.5.
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Definition 5.2 (Uniformity [19]). We say that a function h : X ×L → T is
uniform if for a uniform L and any x ∈ X , T = h(x,L) is uniformly random
on T .
The first keyed hash function, (a secure sketch) ss, is used for error
correction. Apart from the underlying extractor having the required proper-
ties, we additionally need that for a uniformly chosen ℓ ∈ {0, 1}rss and any
x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}nss with Hamming distance w(x, x′) ≤ ϕnss for some fixed ϕ, x
may be recovered from (x′, ss(x, ℓ), ℓ) except with probability εss. This can
be implemented using universal hashing [7], but the recovery operation is
not known to be efficient. Fehr and Salvail propose another construction
based in δ-biased masking [36], which has an efficient recovery operation,
but has less noise tolerance ϕ (see [19] for more details).
The second keyed hash function, mac, is used to detect if the adversary
tampered with the message. The additional requirement is that {mac(·, ℓ)}ℓ
must be a family of εmac-strongly universal hash functions [40, 41], i.e., for
any x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}nmac and t1, t2 ∈ {0, 1}mmac with x1 6= x2,
Pr
ℓ
[mac(x1, ℓ) = t1 and mac(x2, ℓ) = t2] ≤ εmac
2mmac
.
Constructions for such hash functions are given in [40,41], e.g., mac(x, y‖b) =
φ(x ∗ y) + b where φ is any linear surjective function and ∗ and + are mul-
tiplication and addition in the corresponding finite fields. In this example,
Extmac(x, y) = φ(x ∗ y) is a universal hash function, so mac has the required
extractor properties. We denote by νmac the corresponding extractor param-
eter. The probability that tampering is not detected when this function is
used as a standard message authentication code (MAC)— i.e., when a tag
t = mac(x, ℓ) is appended to a message x, and upon receiving (x′, t′), the
receiver checks if t′ = mac(x′, ℓ) [40,41]— is εmac. In the case of the example
given, νmac = 1 and εmac =
1
2mmac .
In the following we denote the length of the message to be authenticated
by m and the length of the first input to ss by n = nss. The function mac is
always used with nmac = n+m+mss.
The final ingredient needed is a code C ⊂ {0, 1}n with minimum distance
d between any two code words.
The modified Fehr-Salvail protocol works as follows (see Remark 5.3 here
below for a description of the differences with the original protocol).
Encryption. The players, Alice and Bob, share keys ℓss ∈ {0, 1}rss , ℓmac ∈
{0, 1}rmac , and θ ∈ C. ℓss and ℓmac have to be uniform. θ has bounded
min-entropy, i.e., it should be generated by a min-entropy resource with
parameter k. To authenticate a message y ∈ {0, 1}m, Alice picks a string
x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly at random, and generates the n qubit quantum state
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Hθ|x〉, where Hθ = ⊗iHθi and H is the Hadamard matrix. She then
computes the values s = ss(x, ℓss) and t = mac(x‖y‖s, ℓmac). Finally, she
sends the cipher consisting of y‖s‖t and ρ = Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ to Bob.
Note that it follows from Lemma D.7 that the function χy : {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}rss+rmac → {0, 1}mss+mmac with χy(x, ℓg‖ℓh) := s‖t provides (νg + νh)-
key-privacy and uniformity.
Decryption. Upon receiving y′‖s′‖t′ and ρ′ from Alice, Bob first computes
Hθρ′Hθ and measures in the computational basis, obtaining x˜. He then uses
the recovery procedure to get x′ from (x˜, s′, ℓss). He checks if w(x′, x˜) ≤ ϕn
and if t′ = h(x′‖y′‖s′, ℓmac). If one of these conditions does not hold, he
rejects the message. Otherwise, he accepts y′ as the message that Alice
sent.
Key recycling. If the message was rejected, Bob recycles ℓss and ℓmac. If
the message was accepted, he recycles ℓss and ℓmac, as well as θ. He sends
one bit of information on a backward authentic channel to Alice to tell her
if he accepted or rejected, and she recycles the same keys.
Remark 5.3. The protocol described here differs in two ways from the orig-
inal Fehr-Salvail protocol [19]. Firstly, the extractors have to be linear in
their first input, which was introduced in the extended version [20] following
an initial draft of the current work pointing out the issue with impersonation
attacks. Secondly, we do not require the players to have fresh key to replace
the discarded θ in case of a reject, our analysis goes through without this.
Hence, in this version of the protocol, the players can run the authentication
scheme even if they only have the keys (ℓss, ℓmac, θ), but no access to a key
refreshing function as in [19,20] that generates a new θ′.
5.3 Analysis
Our task now is to prove that Eqs. (13) and (14) hold and to bound the
corresponding errors. We get similar errors to the original, non-composable
proof [19,20], but with minor improvements in the constants. This is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Let K, K, Hkmin, H
k
min, A
1, Q, Rεϕ, A, and A, be resource
specification as described above and let π = (πA, πB) be the converters run-
ning the modified Fehr-Salvail protocol from Section 5.2. Then
K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Rεϕ
π,εnoise−−−−→ K‖Hkmin‖A
and
K‖Hkmin‖A1‖Q
π,εadv−−−→ K‖Hkmin‖A,
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with εnoise = ε+ εss and
εadv = εmac + (νss + νmac)
√(
2 +
|C|
2d/2
+
|C|2h(ϕ)n
2d
)
2mss+mmac−k. (15)
Proof. The formal statements we will prove are that for any K ∈ K, H ∈
H
k
min, A
1 ∈ A1, and R ∈ Rεϕ, there exists a K′ ∈ K, H′ ∈ Hkmin, A ∈ A, and
a simulator simE such that
πBπA
(
K‖H‖A1‖R) ≈εnoise (K′‖H′‖A)simE ; (16)
and that for any K ∈ K, H ∈ Hkmin, A1 ∈ A1, and Q ∈ Q, there exists a
K′ ∈ K, H′ ∈ Hkmin, A ∈ A, and a simulator simE such that
πBπA
(
K‖H‖A1‖Q) ≈εadv (K′‖H′‖A)simE. (17)
We start with the case of Eq. (16). Since for any resource R, Rε
id,ε−−→ R,
it follows from Theorem 2.2 that it is sufficient to consider a noisy channel
specification Rϕ and add an error ε to the final statement.
The distinguisher could either first provide Alice with a message y to
be encrypted, or first interact with the key resources so that they generate
keys ℓ, θ. The second case is a more powerful distinguisher, since it can
choose a message correlated to θ, due to the side information it has about
θ. So w.l.o.g. we consider only this second case, i.e., the distinguisher first
interacts with Hkmin so that θ is generated, and notifies K to generate the
key ℓ = (ℓss, ℓmac). It then provides a message y to Alice, who prepares the
cipher, and sends it on the noisy channel Rϕ. Due to the error correction
properties of the function ss, Bob can reconstruct the correct x except with
probability εss. If he reconstructs the correct x, then Alice’s message is
always accepted and θ is recycled.
For every H ∈ Hkmin we construct a H′ that behaves identically to H,
except that once θ has been generated, H′ does not accept to output it at
the players’ interface if requested, but waits to get a notification at Eve’s
interface that it can be output. The simulator simE allows the distinguisher
to interact directly with H′, except for the last message. It also blocks the
notification to K′ to generate the key. Once θ has been generated (but
not output), the activation of K′ received from the distinguisher (but not
delivered), and the simulator has received the notification that the message
has been received and delivered by A, it generates the one bit message for
the transcript of the backwards authentic channel and notifies H′ and K′
that their keys can now be output if requested.
These real and ideal systems behave identically, except if Bob fails to
correctly reconstruct x in the real system. So the final error is εnoise = ε+εss.
In the case of Eq. (17), we may also assume w.l.o.g. that the distinguisher
first interacts with Hkmin and notifies K to generate the keys. But it then has
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two options. It first provides Alice with a message y, intercepts and possibly
changes the cipher, and finally obtains Bob’s outcome as well as the keys—
a substitution attack. Or, the distinguisher may first input a cipher on the
insecure channel Q, obtain Bob’s output as well as the recycled keys, then
choose a message y that it inputs at Alice’s interface, and finally gets her
cipher— an impersonation attack.
We start analyzing the substitution attack. This case follows closely
the security proof from [19]. Let ρΘE be the subnormalized state of the
key θ and Eve’s side information after interacting with H when a key θ is
successfully generated. Eve will now measure the E system to choose her
message y, resulting in a new state σYΘE =
∑
y py|y, θ〉〈y, θ| ⊗ σy,θE , where
we have normalized the states so that trσyΘE = tr ρΘE . By definition we
have Hmin(Θ|EY )σ ≥ k. Note that one also has
2−Hmin(Θ|EY )σ = pguess(Θ|EY )σ =∑
y
pypguess(Θ|E)σy =
∑
y
py2
−Hmin(Θ|E)σy . (18)
From now one, we take y to be fixed and σyΘE to be the shared state. At
the end of the proof we average over the different y weighted by py.
Alice runs her authentication protocol, after which the shared state be-
tween Alice and the distinguisher is given by σyLΘXZQE, where Z contains
the classical part of the cipher, Q contains the quantum part, X is the
uniform string that Alice generated and encoded in Q, and L contains the
uniform keys ℓss‖ℓmac. The ZQ systems are intercepted by the distinguisher,
who applies a map E : L(HZQE) → L(HZZ′QE) which leaves Z unmodified
and generates a new Z ′. Let µyLΘXZZ′QE be the resulting state. Z
′Q is
now sent to Bob, who measures Q to get X˜, decodes it with (S′, ℓss) to get
X ′, and checks whether w(X ′, X˜) ≤ ϕn and T ′ = h(Y ′‖S′‖X ′, ℓmac), where
Z ′ = Y ′‖S′‖T ′. He finally sends a bit D to Alice containing his decision. If
D = 1 he outputs the received message Y ′ when requested, and outputs the
keys L and Θ when requested. If D = 0, he outputs an error ⊥ and only
recycles L. Let the final state be ρy
DLΘXX′X˜ZZ′E
.
In the ideal case, we define H′ and simE to work as follows. H′ first runs H,
so that exactly the same key Θ and side information E are generated while
interacting with the distinguisher— the simulator simE lets all these mes-
sages between H′ and the distinguisher go through. Once the distinguisher
has input the message y in the ideal authentic channel, the simulator gets
a copy, which it forwards to H′. H′ then picks its own keys (ℓ′ss, ℓ′mac) uni-
formly at random and a uniform X, and generates a cipher ZQ. It then
outputs ZQ at Eve’s interface, which the simulator simE passes on to the
distinguisher. Let the state shared between the different systems at this
point be σ˜yLΘXZQE, where L represents the new keys that are to be output
by K (not those generated internally by H′). The distinguisher performs the
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same map, E , as when interacting with the real system, resulting in a state
µ˜yLΘXZZ′QE, and gives Z
′Q to the simulator simE who forwards them to H′.
H′ now measures Q just as Bob would do, gets X˜. It then reconstructs X ′,
checks that X ′ = X, that w(X ′, X˜) ≤ ϕn and that Z = Z ′. If one of these
three conditions is not satisfied, it outputs a bit D = 0, otherwise D = 1,
which the simulator intercepts. If D = 0, simE tells the authentic channel
to output an error symbol at Bob’s interface when requested, if D = 1 the
message y is output instead. Regardless of the value of D, simE outputs D
as the bit on the backward authentic channel if requested, and also notifies
K to output a random key ℓ = ℓss‖ℓmac when requested. And if D = 0,
it tells H′ to output ⊥ when requested, otherwise θ. Let the final state be
ρ˜y
DLΘXX′X˜ZZ′E
.
We now need to prove two things. Firstly, that H′ ∈ Hkmin, and secondly
that the real and ideal systems are indistinguishable except with advantage
εadv, i.e.,
1
2
∥∥∥ρy,1LΘZZ′E − ρ˜y,1LΘZZ′E∥∥∥tr ≤ εy,1adv and 12
∥∥∥ρy,0LZZ′E − ρ˜y,0LZZ′E∥∥∥tr ≤ εy,0adv,
(19)
where ρy
LΘXX′X˜ZZ′ED
= ρy,0
LΘXX′X˜ZZ′E
⊗ |0〉〈0|+ ρy,1
LΘXX′X˜ZZ′E
⊗ |1〉〈1| and∑
y py(ε
y,0
adv + ε
y,1
adv) = εadv.
We start with H′ ∈ Hkmin. For this, it is sufficient to show that
Hmin
(
Θ|ZZ ′E)
ρ˜y,1
≥ Hmin(Θ|E)σy ,
where σyΘE is the state output by H (after the measurement to choose y),
since it them follows from Eq. (18) that Θ has enough min-entropy. From
Lemma D.2 we have
Hmin
(
Θ|ZZ ′E)
ρ˜y,1
≥ Hmin
(
Θ|ZZ ′E)
ρ˜y
= Hmin
(
Θ|ZZ ′E)
µ˜y
.
Applying a map to the side information can only increase the entropy, hence
Hmin
(
Θ|ZZ ′E)
µ˜y
≥ Hmin(Θ|ZQE)σ˜y .
Because Z = y‖S‖T and the function which computes S‖T is uniform (see
Definition 5.2), Z is independent from the other systems, hence
Hmin(Θ|ZQE)σ˜y = Hmin(Θ|QE)σ˜y .
Finally, Q was generated by applying a unitary Hθ to a fully mixed state
1
2n
∑
x |x〉〈x|, so Q is also fully mixed and independent of the other systems
(which contain no information about x), hence
Hmin(Θ|QE)σ˜y = Hmin(Θ|E)σ˜y .
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We now return to Eq. (19). From the properties of mac, it follows that if
D = 1, then Z ′ = Z and X ′ = X except with probability εmac, i.e., the state
ρ¯y
LΘXX′X˜Y ′ZZ′ED
obtained by flipping the value of D from 1 to 0 if either
Z ′ 6= Z or X ′ 6= X must be εmac-close to ρyLΘXX′X˜ZZ′ED. It now suffices to
bound the distance between ρ˜y and ρ¯y. To simplify notation, we introduce
a new register Θ′ such that if D = 0, Θ′ = ⊥, and if D = 1, then Θ′ = Θ.
Thus, we are now trying to prove that
1
2
∥∥ρ¯yLΘ′ZZ′ED − ρ˜yLΘ′ZZ′ED∥∥tr ≤ εyadv − εmac. (20)
In the ideal case we have ρ˜yLΘ′ZZ′ED = τL ⊗ ρ¯yΘ′ZZ′ED, where τL is the
fully mixed state, because by construction L is uniform and independent of
the rest, and ρ˜yΘ′ZZ′ED = ρ¯
y
Θ′ZZ′ED— H
′ runs the real protocol, the only
difference is the reject condition, but by the flip of D that generated ρ¯y
from ρy makes them now abort under the same conditions. Plugging this in
Eq. (20), it remains to show that
1
2
∥∥ρ¯yLΘ′ZZ′ED − τL ⊗ ρ¯yΘ′ZZ′ED∥∥tr ≤ εyadv − εmac.
From Lemma D.7 it follows that the function
χy : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}rss+rmac → {0, 1}mss+mmac
with χy(x, ℓss‖ℓmac) := s‖t, s = ss(x, ℓss), and t = mac(x‖y‖s, ℓmac) provides
(νss + νmac)-key-privacy. Furthermore, the state ρ¯
y
LXΘ′ZZ′ED satisfies the
assumptions of Definition 5.1 (with T = Z). Hence we have
1
2
∥∥ρ¯yLΘ′ZZ′ED − τL ⊗ ρ¯yΘ′ZZ′ED∥∥tr
≤ νss + νmac
2
√
2−Hmin(X|Θ
′ZZ′ED)ρ¯y+mss+mmac .
It now remains to upper bound
2−Hmin(X|Θ
′ZZ′ED)ρ¯y = pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′ED)
ρ¯y
= pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y
,
where we have removed D because this register is redundant, it can be
inferred from Θ′ (since Θ′ = ⊥ ⇐⇒ D = 0).
Let us define a new register Ω which takes the value 1 if w(X, X˜) ≤ ϕn
and Ω = 0 otherwise. Let ρ¯yXΘ′ZZ′EΩ = ρ¯
y,0
XΘ′ZZ′E⊗|0〉〈0|+ ρ¯y,1XΘ′ZZ′E⊗|1〉〈1|.
We have
pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y
≤ pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′EΩ)
ρ¯y
= pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,0
+ pguess
(
X|Θ′ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,1
≤ pguess
(
X|ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,0
+ pguess
(
X|ΘZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,1
.
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The third line follows because adding Θ to the side information when Θ′ = ⊥
can only increase the probability of guessing X.
We now bound these two terms separately.
pguess
(
X|ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,0
≤ pguess
(
X|ZZ ′E)
ρ¯y
= pguess
(
X|ZZ ′E)
ρy
= pguess
(
X|ZZ ′E)
µy
≤ pguess(X|ZQE)σy
= pguess(X|QE)σy .
The first line follows from Lemma D.2. The fourth line follows because
applying a map to the side information can only decrease the probability of
guessing X. The fifth line follows because χy is uniform so Z is independent.
Finally, by noting that σyΘXQE = MBB84ΘA,X
(
σyΘXE ⊗ Φ+AQ
)
, where Φ+AQ are
EPR pairs and MBB84ΘA,X measures A according to the basis in Θ and writes
the result in X (see Appendix D.4 for a formal definition of MBB84ΘA,X), we
can apply Lemma D.8 with B = QE, from which we get
pguess(X|QE)σy ≤ pguess(Θ|E)σy
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
.
To bound pguess(X|ΘZZ ′E)ρ¯y,1 we will use Lemma D.9. Let PΩ be an
operator which projects the state on the event Ω = 1, namely w(X, X˜) ≤ ϕn.
LetMBB84
ΘQ,X˜
be Bob’s measurement of the cipher Q that yields the string X˜.
Let E : L(HZQE)→ L(HZZ′QE) be the map performed by the distinguisher
on the cipher. We thus have ρ¯y,1XΘZZ′E = trX˜ ◦ PΩ ◦MBB84ΘQ,X˜ ◦ E(σYXΘZQE).
Note furthermore that by the uniformity of χy, Z = y‖S‖T where S‖T is
uniform and independent from the other registers, andXQmay be generated
by measuring halves of EPR pairs Φ+AQ according to Θ (which commutes
with E). Hence we have
ρ¯y,1XΘZZ′E = trX˜ ◦PΩ ◦MBB84ΘQ,X˜ ◦MBB84ΘA,X ◦ E(σ
y
ΘE ⊗ Φ+AQ ⊗ τZ).
This puts us in a position to apply Lemma D.9 with B = Q and C = ZZ ′E,
from which we get
pguess
(
X|ΘZZ ′E)
ρ¯y,1
≤ pguess(Θ|E)σy
(
1 +
|C|2h(ϕ)n
2d
)
.
Finally, taking the average over py along with Jensen’s inequality, we get
the bound from Eq. (15).
The final case to consider is that of impersonation attacks. In the real
system, the distinguisher sends a forged cipher to Bob, who performs the
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decoding. He then either accepts and recycles both ℓ = (ℓss, ℓmac) and θ, or
rejects and recycles only ℓ = (ℓss, ℓmac). Let σLΘED denote the joint state at
this point, where, as previously, D is Bob’s decision to accept or reject the
message, L contains the uniform keys (ℓss, ℓmac), Θ is the non-uniform key
(which may have been given to the distinguisher if D = 1).
The distinguisher can then choose a message Y to input at Alice’s in-
terface for encryption. Let E : L(HLΘED) → L(HLΘY ED) be the operator
applied by the distinguisher to generate Y , which we define so as to leave
the classical registers LΘD unmodified, and furthermore, E is only allowed
to use information from Θ if D = 1. We denote the resulting state by
ρLΘY ED = E(σLΘED). Finally, Alice’s protocol generates a cipher, resulting
in the joint shared state ρLΘUY QED, where UY denotes the classical part of
the cipher with U = S‖T (jointly written Z = Y ‖S‖T in the proof against
substitution attacks), and Q is the quantum part of the cipher.
In the ideal case, if the simulator simE receives a forged cipher at its
outer interface from the distinguisher before it receives the message y from
the authentic channel, it knows that we are dealing with an impersonation
attack. It then tells the authentic channel to output an error when requested,
the key resource K′ to output some fresh uniform key ℓ = (ℓss, ℓmac) when
requested, and the min-entropy resource H′ to output an error ⊥ when re-
quested. Let σ˜LΘED denote the joint state at this point. As in the real case,
the distinguisher applies the map E to generate a message Y , inputs this to
the authentic channel, which gives it to the simulator. simE now picks its
own key ℓ′ and asks H′ to give it the key θ that it generated while running
H internally. simE then follows the protocol and generates a cipher Y UQ,
which it outputs at its outer interface. Let the final state shared by the
different parties be ρ˜LΘUY QED.
As in the case of impersonation attacks, we need to prove two things.
Firstly, that H′ ∈ Hkmin, and secondly, that
1
2
‖ρLUY QED − ρ˜LUY QED‖tr ≤ εadv. (21)
Note that Eq. (21) does not contain Θ. This is because it is only ever recy-
cled in the real case (the ideal system cannot get fooled by an impersonation
attack), but the bit D = 1 is already enough to perfectly distinguisher real
from ideal in this case, one does not need Θ.
Since H′ always outputs ⊥, it trivially satisfies the definition of a (k, 0)-
min-entropy resource. For bounding Eq. (21), note that by the definition
of mac, the probability of accepting the forged cipher is at most εmac. Let
σ¯LΘED be the state obtained by flipping D from 1 to 0 on σLΘED and define
ρ¯LΘUY QED as the state obtained after the distinguisher applies E to σ¯LΘED
and Alice generates the cipher. Then
1
2
‖ρLUY QED − ρ¯LUY QED‖tr ≤ εmac.
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Furthemore, in the ideal system one has ρ˜LUY QED = τL ⊗ τU ⊗ ρ¯Y QED,
where τL and τU are fully mixed states. This follows, because L is uniform
by definition, U is uniform because it is generated by the uniform function χy,
and ρ˜Y QED = ρ¯Y QED because the simulator uses the same θ and performs
the same operation to generate Q. Since we always have D = 0, this register
can be removed, and it remains to show that,
1
2
‖ρ¯LUY QE − τL ⊗ τU ⊗ ρ¯Y QE‖tr ≤ εadv − εmac.
We now look more closely at how the protocol generates U . Since the
extractors used are linear, we have u = s‖t with s = Aℓssx + bℓss and t =
Aℓmac(x‖y‖s)+ bℓmac , where Aℓss and Aℓmac are matrices, and bℓss and bℓmac are
strings, which depend on ℓss and ℓmac. One can alternatively write this as u =(
Aℓssx‖A1ℓmacx
)
+
(
0‖A3ℓmacAℓssx
)
+Bℓss,ℓmacy + cℓss,ℓmac , where A
1
ℓmac
and A3ℓmac
are the first n columns and last mss columns of Aℓmac = A
1
ℓmac
‖A2ℓmac‖A3ℓmac ,
respectively, and Bℓss,ℓmac and cℓss,ℓmac are a matrix and string which depend
on ℓss and ℓmac.
Since Extmac(x‖y‖s, ℓmac) = Aℓmac(x‖y‖s) is a (k, ε)-strong extractor,
then so is Ext′mac(x, ℓmac) := A1ℓmacx. And from Lemma D.5 and the bounds
on the errors of Extss and Extmac, we find that Ext(x, ℓss‖ℓmac) := Aℓssx‖A1ℓmacx
is a (k, ε)-strong extractor for any k and ε = νss+νmac2
√
2−k+mss+mmac . The
state ρ¯LUY QE may thus be written as ρ¯LUY QE = G ◦ F
(
ρ¯LExt(X,L)Y QE
)
,
where F : L(HLU) → L(HLU ) with U = ST reads L and S and XORs
A3ℓmacs to the T register, and G : L(HLUY )→ L(HLUY ) reads L and Y and
XORs Bℓss,ℓmacy and cℓss,ℓmac to U . Since L is uniform and independent from
ρ¯Y QE , it follows from the definition of an extractor that
1
2
∥∥G ◦ F(ρ¯LExt(X,L)Y QE)− G ◦ F(τL ⊗ τU ⊗ ρ¯Y QE)∥∥tr
≤ νss + νmac
2
√
2−Hmin(X|Y QE)ρ¯+mss+mmac .
To finish the proof we need that F and G XOR a value to a uniform
string, which results in a uniform string, hence
G ◦ F(τL ⊗ τU ⊗ ρ¯Y QE) = τL ⊗ τU ⊗ ρ¯Y QE,
and we need to upper bound 2−Hmin(X|Y QE)ρ¯ = pguess(X|Y QE)ρ¯. This latter
bound is obtained from Lemma D.8 following the same steps as the bound
on pguess(X|QE)σy in the case of substitution attacks, from which we get
pguess(X|Y QE)ρ¯ ≤ pguess(Θ|E)σ
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
≤ 2k
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
.
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5.4 Continuing after a reject
Since the construction from Theorem 5.4 generates the same resources K
and Hkmin that it uses, it is trivial to recursively apply the protocol to au-
thenticate multiple messages using the same keys. By Theorem 2.2, the error
of n runs of the protocol, π ◦ · · · ◦ π, is nεadv. But note that the protocol
does not perform anything if it gets an error from the resource Hkmin instead
of a key. This way of composing the protocol with itself aborts all future
rounds as soon as tampering is detected and the key θ is not recycled.
One can imagine a different scenario, in which the players have spare
secret key, which they use to replace θ, if it cannot be recycled. Let K denote
such an extra key resource, and let Hkmin denote a min-entropy resource,
which might produce an error ⊥. Given these two resources, we wish to
construct a new resource Hk
′
min which always outputs a key, by “giving” the
key from K to Hkmin. We are then left with a resource K which might still
output a key if it was not given to Hkmin. K can be defined as in Figure 4,
with a switch that decides if it produces a key or not.
Lemma 5.5. Let πnew = (πnewA , π
new
B ) be a protocol where both π
new
A and
πnewB get keys (k, θ) from K and H
k
min. If θ 6= ⊥, they output (k, θ) at their
outer interfaces when requested. If θ = ⊥, they output (⊥, k) at their outer
interfaces instead. Then
K‖Hkmin
πnew,0−−−−→ K‖Hk′min
with k′ = − log(2−n + 2−k).
Proof. Let H ∈ Hkmin, and after interacting with this, let the shared state of
the key and the distinguisher be ρΘE = |⊥〉〈⊥|⊗µE+σΘE withHmin(Θ|E)σ ≥
k.
We define H′ to run H, and if it gets ⊥, it generates a fresh uniform
key τΘ, which it outputs when requested. The shared state is then ρ
′
ΘE =
τΘ ⊗ µE + σXE . One has
pguess(Θ|E)ρ′ ≤ pguess(Θ|E)τ⊗µ + pguess(Θ|E)σ ≤ 2−n + 2−k.
Hence
Hmin(Θ|E)ρ′ = − log pguess(Θ|E)ρ′ ≥ − log
(
2−n + 2−k
)
.
This shows that H′ ∈ Hkmin. We additionally need H′ to output at Eve’s
interface whether H generated ⊥ or not, and for a simulator to activate the
corresponding switch on K.
If one has enough spare key K, recursively composing πnew with the
modified Fehr-Salvail protocol π—i.e., running π ◦πnew ◦π ◦ · · · ◦πnew ◦π—
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allows one to encrypt multiple messages by using keys from K to replace
lost θ. Note that since the entropy of the key decreases slightly when this
is done, the error εadv will increase slightly with each run (if one does not
change the parameters to compensate).
Appendices
A Notation and basic concepts
We assume the reader is familiar with basic quantum information theory,
e.g., textbooks such as [42, 43]. In this appendix we explain the notation,
and introduce the distance and entropy measures that we use in this work.
A.1 Quantum states, maps, and norms
We use standard notation for quantum information theory. H denotes a
Hilbert space. In all sections except Section 3.2 and Appendix B.2, where
causal boxes are used, Hilbert spaces are finite dimensional. In finite di-
mensions, L(H) denotes the set of linear operators on H, S(H) is the set of
normalized positive operators— density operators— and S≤(H) is the set
of subnormalized positive operators, i.e., if ρ ∈ S≤(H), then 0 ≤ tr ρ ≤ 1.
In infinite dimensions, T(H) denotes the set of trace class operators.19
We write HAB = HA ⊗ HB for a bipartite quantum system and ρAB ∈
S≤(HAB) for a bipartite (subnormalized) quantum state. ρA = trB(ρAB)
and ρB = trA(ρAB) denote the corresponding reduced density operators.
Let E : L(HA)→ L(HB) be a completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP)
map.20 When it is applied to a state ρ ∈ S≤(HAC), we write E(ρ) as
shorthand for (E ⊗ idC)(ρ), where idC is the identity on system C.
The only norm we need in this work is the trace norm (or Schatten 1-
norm), defined as ‖A‖tr := tr
√
A†A.
A.2 Distance measures
The trace distance between two states ρ and σ is given by
D(ρ, σ) :=
1
2
‖ρ− σ‖tr.
This corresponds to the maximum advantage one has in distinguishing be-
tween the two states, i.e., if given ρ or σ chosen uniformly at random one
19V ∈ T(H) if ‖V ‖tr =
∑
i 〈i|
√
V †V |i〉 < ∞, where {|i〉} is an orthonormal basis of H.
A density operator is a non-negative self-adjoint operator ρ ∈ T(H) with tr ρ = 1.
20In the case of infinite dimensional systems, a CPTP map acts on trace class operators,
E : T(HA)→ T(HB).
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has to guess which one we hold, then the probability of guessing correctly is
[43]
p =
1
2
+
1
2
D(ρ, σ).
Another widely used measure is the fidelity, defined as
F (ρ, σ) := tr
(√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)
.
When dealing with subnormalized states, we need to generalize these
measures to retain their properties. The following distance notions are
treated in detail in [33], and we refer to that work for more information.
For any two subnormalized states ρ, σ ∈ S≤(H), we define the generalized
trace distance as
D¯(ρ, σ) := D(ρ, σ) +
1
2
| tr ρ− trσ|,
and the generalized fidelity as
F¯ (ρ, σ) := F (ρ, σ) +
√
(1− tr ρ)(1− trσ).
The (generalized) fidelity has a useful property, known as Uhlmann’s
theorem (see [33, 42]), which states that for any two states ρ and σ, there
exist purifications of these states which have the same fidelity. The purified
distance is defined based on the fidelity, so as to have the same property [33]:
P (ρ, σ) :=
√
1− F¯ 2(ρ, σ).
This metric coincides with the generalized distance for pure states, and
is larger otherwise.
Lemma A.1 ([33, Lemma 6]). Let ρ, σ ∈ S≤(H). Then
D¯(ρ, σ) ≤ P (ρ, σ) ≤
√
2D¯(ρ, σ).
The purified distance is used to define smooth min-entropy in the follow-
ing section.
A.3 Min-entropy
The smooth conditional min-entropy that we use throughout this work to
define the randomness of a quantum system was first proposed by Renner [7].
It represents the optimal measure for randomness extraction in the sense that
it is always possible to extract that amount of almost uniform randomness
from a source, but never more. Before defining this notion, we first state a
non-smooth version.
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Definition A.2 (conditional min-entropy [7]). Let ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB). The
min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max{λ ∈ R : ∃σB ∈ S(HB) s.t. 2−λ1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB},
where 1A denotes the identity operator and A ≥ B if and only if A − B is
positive semi-definite (A−B ≥ 0).
We will often drop the subscript ρ when there is no doubt about what
underlying state is meant.
This definition has a simple operational interpretation when the first
system is classical, which is the case we consider. Ko¨nig et al. [44] showed
that for a state ρXB =
∑
x∈X px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB classical on X,
Hmin(X|B)ρ = − log pguess(X|B)ρ, (22)
where pguess(X|B) is the maximum probability of guessingX given B, namely
pguess(X|B)ρ := max{Γx}x∈X
(∑
x∈X
px tr(Γxρ
x
B)
)
,
where the maximum is taken over all positive-operator valued measures
(POVMs) {Γx}x∈X on B (i.e., Γx is positive and
∑
x Γx = I). If the system
B is empty, then the min-entropy of X reduces to the Re´nyi entropy of order
infinity, Hmin(X) = − logmaxx∈X px (often written H∞(X)). In this case
the connection to the guessing probability is particularly obvious: when no
side information is available, the best guess we can make is simply the value
x ∈ X with highest probability.
The smooth min-entropy then consists in maximizing the min-entropy
over all subnormalized states δ-close in the purified distance to the actual
state ρXB of the system considered. Thus by introducing an extra error δ,
we have a state with potentially much more entropy.
Definition A.3 (smooth min-entropy [7,33]). Let δ ≥ 0 and ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB),
then the δ-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Hδmin(A|B)ρ := max
σAB :P (σ,ρ)≤δ
Hmin(A|B)σ.
B Formalizing Information-Processing Systems
B.1 Quantum Combs
A quantum comb [27–29] (see also [30–32]) models an interactive quantum
information-processing system that receives an input, sends an output, re-
ceives an input, sends an output, etc, and terminates after a fixed number
of steps. Such a system is drawn in Figure 10. One trivial way to model
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Figure 10 – A single information-processing system modeled as a comb. The
nodes represent an operation and the arrows capture a quantum state. Each
tooth of the comb corresponds to a pair of an input and an output message.
such systems is to explicitly denote their internal memory, e.g., let HM be
the space of the internal memory, then a system is given by a sequence of
CPTP maps:
Ei : L(HXiM )→ L(HMYi).
Let the internal memory start in some initial state |0〉M . Upon receiving
an input ρX1 ∈ L(HX1) one can evaluate the output and new memory state
as σMY1 = E1(ρX1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|M ). Upon receiving the next input σX2 , the new
memory state and output are τMY2 = E2(σX2M ), etc.
A more compact representation of a comb which omits the internal mem-
ory is given by a single CPTP map
E : L(HX1···Xn)→ L(HY1···Yn),
which, for all i ∈ [n] and all ρX1···Xn , σX1···Xn ∈ L(HX1···Xn) such that
ρX1···Xi = σX1···Xi satisfies the relation
trYi+1···Yn [E(ρX1···Xn)] = trYi+1···Yn [E(σX1···Xn)],
i.e., if the inputs are identical up to position i, then the outputs must be
identical up to position i as well. This can be seen as a causality condition,
namely that an input after i cannot influence an output before i.
A very convenient representation of combs is given by the Choi-Jamio l-
kowski representation [43] of the map E , namely the operator RY1···YnX1···Xn ∈
L(HY1···YnX1···Xn) given by
RY1···YnX1···Xn :=
∑
i,j
E(|i〉〈j|)⊗ |i〉〈j|.
The causality condition then becomes
trYi+1···Yn(RY1···YnX1···Xn) = RY1···YiX1···Xi ⊗ IXi+1···Xn .
Remark B.1 (Sequential scheduling). If the output value in register Yi corre-
sponds to one message being sent to one (random) party—where the name
of the party might be a classical part of the message— then the composition
of combs obtained by routing messages to the correct parties is alway a new
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Alice
Bob
Charlie
Alice!
Bob
!
Alice
or Bob?
Figure 11 – Alice and Bob both send messages to Charlie, who outputs the
first message he receives. Although each system can be described by a comb,
the composition of the three, depicted as the dashed box, is undefined.
well-defined comb.21 The systems used in this work in all sections except
Section 3.2 follow this rule, and are thus modeled as quantum combs. In
Appendix B.2 we discuss some settings that do not use sequential scheduling,
and thus need a more complex model of systems to be captured.
B.2 Causal Boxes
The quantum combs introduced in Appendix B.1 are well-suited for model-
ing finite systems with sequential scheduling, which is the case for all the
concrete protocols analyzed in this work. There are however situations which
require a more developed model of systems. Consider the example drawn
in Figure 11: two players, Alice and Bob, each send a message to a third
player, Charlie, who outputs the first message he receives and ignores the
second. Each of the systems is a well-defined comb. Alice and Bob just out-
put a single message. When Charlie receives the first message, m = (v, p)—
value v from player p—he outputs v and ignores all further inputs. But the
composition of all three systems (depicted as a dashed box in Figure 11) is
not defined: it is a system with no input and one output, but this output is
undetermined.
The composition of these three systems is undefined, because Charlie’s
output depends on the order of the messages he receives, but this is not
specified by the individual systems of Alice and Bob. The causal box frame-
work [26] was developed to model such systems. It achieves this by assigning
a tag t ∈ T to values v ∈ V that are output (and input) by quantum infor-
mation-processing systems. T is a partially ordered set (e.g., T = Q), and
t ∈ T , which can be thought of as a time, denotes the order of v with re-
spect to other messages. This also allows superpositions of causal structures
to be modeled by allowing a message to be in a superposition of different
positions, e.g., |t1〉+ |t2〉. Additionally, when the cardinality of T is infinite,
21This follows because in such a network of systems, there is always ever only one active
party, the one that has just received a message. Thus, the next message to be output and
the next active party is always uniquely defined.
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the resulting causal boxes can process an unbounded number of messages,
e.g., a beacon which outputs a qubit every second is valid causal box, but
cannot be modeled as a quantum comb.
More precisely, a quantum message that is either input to or output
from a causal box is an element of a Hilbert space with an orthonormal
basis given by {|v, t〉}v∈V ,t∈T . For a finite V and infinite T , this Hilbert
space corresponds to
C|V| ⊗ ℓ2(T ) , (23)
where ℓ2(T ) = {(xt)t∈T : xt ∈ C, ‖x‖ < ∞} is the sequence space with
bounded 2-norm with ‖x‖ =
√
〈x|x〉 and 〈x|y〉 =∑t∈T xtyt.
An arrow used in figures such as Figure 6 captures an unbounded number
of messages being output or input. We refer to such an object as a wire
(which may connect two systems), and its Hilbert space is given by a Fock
space,
F(H) :=
∞⊕
n=0
∨nH , (24)
where ∨nH denotes the symmetric subspace of H⊗n, and H⊗0 is the one
dimensional space containing the vacuum state |Ω〉. Plugging Eq. (23) into
Eq. (24) for a d dimensional value (|V| = d), we find that the message space
of a wire is
F
(
Cd ⊗ ℓ2(T )
)
=
∞⊕
n=0
∨n
(
Cd ⊗ ℓ2(T )
)
. (25)
The orthogonal subspaces ∨n(Cd ⊗ ℓ2(T )) for n ∈ N0 capture n messages
being sent on a wire. The restriction to the symmetric space guarantees that
there is no order amongst the messages other than what might be defined
from their state, e.g., their position in T .
Let A denote a wire that carries dA-dimensional messages. Abusing
language, we will refer to this as a dA-dimensional wire.
22 We write FTA for
the corresponding state space, namely
FTA := F
(
CdA ⊗ ℓ2(T )
)
.
Note that for any Hilbert spaces HA and HB ,
F(HA)⊗F(HB) ∼= F(HA ⊕HB) , (26)
where the isomorphism preserves the meaning associated with the bases of
the Fock spaces, i.e., a tensor product of two vacuum states on the left in
Eq. (26) is mapped to a vacuum state on the right, a tensor product of a
vacuum state and one message on the left is mapped to a single message
with the same value and position on the right, etc. (see [26] for the exact
22The Hilbert space of the wire is in fact infinite dimensional.
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isomorphism). This allows the tensor product of two wires with dimensions
dA and dB to be written as one wire with dimension dA + dB ,
FTA ⊗FTB ∼= FTAB .
Similarly, for any P ⊂ T , a wire may be split in two parts corresponding to
messages in P and P˜ := T \ P, respectively:
FTA ∼= FPA ⊗F P˜A .
We use this in particular to trace out messages that are not before some
position t ∈ T by taking P = {p ∈ T : p ≤ t}, e.g.,
ρ≤tA = trt(ρA).
Let FTX and FTY denote the Hilbert spaces of an input wire X and output
wire Y . And let T(FTX ) and T(FTY ) be the corresponding sets of trace class
operators. For the specical case of a totally ordered set T ,23 a causal box is
defined as a set of mutually consistent CPTP maps
R =
{
E≤t : T(FTX)→ T(F≤tY )}
t∈T
,
i.e., for t ≤ u,
E≤t = tr>t ◦ E≤u.
In some cases the map E = limt→∞ E≤t is well-defined, in which case a causal
box can be defined by this limit instead of by the sequence.
As for quantum combs, causal boxes must satisfy a notion of causality,
so that an input before position t cannot influence an output after position t.
The exact definition is not needed in this work, so we omit it, and refer the
interested reader to [26]. Similarly, causal boxes can be represented using
the Choi-Jamio lkowski isomorphism, which we omit here as well.
Causal boxes may be connected in arbitrary ways, i.e., any output wire
of one box can be “plugged into” an input wire of the same dimension from
a different box, or may be looped back and connected to one if its own
inputs. This always results in a new well-defined causal box, even if loops
are present. It does not create any causality conflicts since messages are
ordered and an output can only depend on inputs that arrived before.
Remark B.2 (From combs to causal boxes). Quantum combs may be seen
as special cases of causal boxes, which do not specify the positions t ∈ T
of the outputs, only the (local) order with respect to the other outputs it
generates. One can easily “upgrade” a quantum comb to a causal box by
assigning some (fixed) processing time δi to produce the output Yi after
receiving the input Xi, in which case it inherits all the properties (e.g.,
closure under composition) of causal boxes. Alternatively, a comb can be
modeled as a specification of causal boxes, namely those that produce the
same outputs in the same order, but at undetermined times.
23The case for a partial order on T can be found in [26].
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C Quantum Key Distribution
A QKD protocol typically has three phases.24 In the first, the players ex-
change some quantum states— either one player (Alice) generates them and
sends them to the other (Bob), or an untrusted third party (Eve) prepares
states that are sent to both players. We assume for simplicity that the
players measure the quantum states upon reception, but the same analysis
holds for protocols that require quantum memory as well. In Figure 3 we
illustrated the case where the players have access to an (insecure) quantum
channel that they use to send quantum states from Alice to Bob. In the
second phase of the protocol, the players compare some of the measurement
results to estimate the amount of noise on the channel. At the end of this
phase, they obtain a bound on the entropy of the remaining undisclosed bit
strings conditioned on the adversary’s information. In the final phase, the
players run some (classical) post-processing protocols on the strings they
hold to extract a secret key. More precisely, they first need to correct er-
rors between the strings held by Alice and Bob. Then they run a privacy
amplification step to extract a secret key from their strings.
In Section 4 we used these error correction and privacy amplification
procedures to get a secret key from any min-entropy resource. Here, we show
that a standard QKD security proof, but with the post-processing omitted,
constructs such a min-entropy resource. More precisely, let πdisAB = (π
dis
A , π
dis
B )
be a protocol that distributes quantum states using an insecure channel Q,
then uses an authentic channel Ac to compare the measurement results,
and either aborts or produces two (random) strings X and Y . Let Eve have
access to the quantum channel and apply any operation allowed by quantum
mechanics to the states being sent, and let her obtain a transcript of the
messages sent on the classical authentic channel. We prove below that if we
can bound the information Eve has about X, then πdisAB constructs a min-
entropy resource.
Proving that we can bound the information Eve has about X is the
difficult part of QKD security proofs. Here we only show that if this can be
done, then the protocol can be written as a constructive statement in the AC
framework. An overview of how one can actually bound Eve’s information
can be found in [23], and detailed security proofs for BB84 and BBM92 that
compute these bounds are given in [14].
Lemma C.1. Let πdisAB = (π
dis
A , π
dis
B ) be a protocol as described above. Sup-
pose that one can prove that the subnormalized state σXY E resulting from
Alice and Bob not aborting is such that Hδmin(X|E)σ ≥ k. And let H
k,δ
min
be a (k, δ)-min-entropy resource where the output Y at Bob’s interface is
arbitrary (but is always ⊥ if Alice’s is ⊥). Then πdisAB (perfectly) constructs
24A detailed review of QKD can be found in [23].
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H
k,δ
min from Q‖Ac,
Q‖Ac π
dis
AB,0−−−−→ Hk,δmin.
Proof. We will show that πdisAB(Q‖Ac) ⊂ H
k,δ
min. By contradiction, suppose
there exists H ∈ πdisAB(Q‖Ac) such that H /∈ H
k,δ
min. This means there must
exist an S such that the output ρXE = |⊥〉〈⊥| ⊗ τE + σXE after interacting
with H has Hδmin(X|E)σ < k. By running such a system S, Eve would thus
obtain more information about the string X than allowed.
If no adversary is eavesdropping on the quantum channel Q, but instead
it is only subject to natural noise, then one can make stronger statements
than Lemma C.1 in which Y is not arbitrary, but a bound on the number
of errors between X and Y is known, and the probability of aborting is
also bounded. Such statements are necessary for proving the robustness of
the protocols, i.e., the probability that they terminate with a shared secret
key when only natural noise is present (see [21] for a formal treatment of
robustness in QKD.)
For example, instead of an insecure channel Q, let the players share a
noisy channel specification C such as the depolarizing channels depicted in
Figure 1b. Then one can often prove statements such as
C‖Ac π
dis
AB,εnoise−−−−−−→ Rk,δmin, (27)
where R
k,δ
min ⊂ H
k,δ
min is a specification of min-entropy resources that never
aborts and outputs strings X and Y with specific correlations (e.g., no more
than t bit flips).
Composing Corollary 4.7, Lemma C.1, and Eq. (27), we recover the stan-
dard QKD security statement [21].
Corollary C.2. Let πqkd = πpa ◦ πec ◦ πdis consist of the composition of the
protocols described here and Section 4, then
C‖Ac π
qkd,εnoise+εpa+2δ−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Km,
and
Q‖Ac π
qkd,εverif+εpa+2δ−−−−−−−−−−−→ Km,
where Ac = Ac1‖Ac2‖Ac3 , and Aci are the authentic channels used by the
different parts of the protocol.
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D Technical Lemmas
D.1 Min-entropy inequalities
The following inequality shows that if an additional r bit string Z is given
to the adversary, then she gets r bits of information.
Lemma D.1 ([45, Lemma 11]). Let ρ ∈ S≤(HABZ) be any subnormalized
state where Z is a classical system over the alphabet Z. Then
Hδmin(A|BZ)ρ ≥ Hδmin(A|B)ρ − log |Z|.
The next inequality shows that the min-entropy of a state conditioned
on an event is bounded by the min-entropy before this conditioning.
Lemma D.2. Let ρ ∈ S≤(HABZ) be any subnormalized state with a binary
classical register Z. This state may be written as
ρABZ = ρ
0
AB ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ ρ1AB ⊗ |1〉〈1|.
Then
Hδmin(A|B)ρ0 ≥ Hδmin(A|B)ρ .
Proof. Follows from [14, Lemma 10] by taking X to be empty, Y = Z and
Ω : Y → {0, 1} is the identity. We also remove the condition δ ∈ [0,√tr ρ)
by defining Hmin(A|B)ρ = +∞ if tr ρ = 0.
D.2 Extractors
Extractors are usually defined on normalized states. We show here than
any extractor for normalized states is also an extractor for subnormalized
states. This proof follows the steps of an equivalent proof for multi-source
extractors in the Markov model from [46, Lemma 37], but is adapted to
seeded extractors.
Lemma D.3. If Ext is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractor for nor-
malized states, then it is a quantum-proof (k + 1, 2ε)-strong extractor for
subnormalized states.
Proof. Let ρXE ∈ S≤(HXE) be a subnormalized state with Hmin(X|E)ρ ≥
k+1, and let p = tr(ρXE). We define ρ˜E :=
1−p
p ρE and the normalized state
σXEP := ρXE ⊗ |0〉〈0|P + τX ⊗ ρ˜E ⊗ |1〉〈1|P , (28)
where τX is the fully mixed state.
This state satisfies a slightly modified min-entropy condition:
pguess(X|EP )σ = pguess(X|E)ρ + pguess(X|E)τ⊗ρ˜
≤ 2−k−1 + (1− p)2−n ≤ 2−k,
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where n is the length of the string X. Hence Hmin(X|EP )σ ≥ k. And
because Ext is an extractor for normalized states it follows that
1
2
∥∥σExt(X,Z)ZEP − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ σEP∥∥tr ≤ ε.
Plugging in Eq. (28) and tracing out P , we get
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Z)ZE − τExt(X,Z)Z ⊗ ρ˜E − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρE + τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρ˜E∥∥tr ≤ ε.
Thus starting from the expression ‖ρExt(X,Z)ZE − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρE‖tr and then
adding and subtracting the term τExt(X,Z)Z ⊗ ρ˜E − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρ˜E as well as
applying the triangle inequality leaves us with
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Z)ZE − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρE∥∥tr
≤ ε+ 1
2
∥∥τExt(X,Z)Z ⊗ ρ˜E − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρ˜E∥∥tr
≤ ε+ 1
2
tr(ρ˜E)
∥∥τExt(X,Z)Z − τK ⊗ τZ∥∥tr ≤ 2ε.
The following lemma shows that any extractor defined for subnormalized
states can be used to extract from states with a bound on the smooth min-
entropy instead of on the min-entropy with a small adjustment to the error
parameter. Note that the original lemma from [39, Lemma 3.5] omitted to
specify that the extractor has to be defined for subnormalized states for the
proof to go through.
Lemma D.4 ([39, Lemma 3.5]). If Ext is a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong ex-
tractor for subnormalized states, then for any subnormalized ρXE ∈ S≤(HXE)
with classical X and Hδmin(X|E)ρ ≥ k, and a uniform Z,
1
2
∥∥ρExt(X,Z)ZE − τK ⊗ τZ ⊗ ρE∥∥tr ≤ ε+ 2δ,
where τK is the fully mixed state.
The final extractor lemma that we need states that the composition of
two extractors is also an extractor, and is also taken from [39].
Lemma D.5 ([39, Lemma A.4]). Let Ext1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1 → {0, 1}m1
and Ext2 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d2 → {0, 1}m2 be quantum-proof (k, ε1)- and (k −
m1, ε2)-strong extractors for subnormalized states. Then the composition of
the two, namely
Ext3 :{0, 1}n × {0, 1}d1+d2 → {0, 1}m1+m2
(x, y1‖y2) 7→ Ext1(x, y1)‖Ext2(x, y2),
is a quantum-proof (k, ε1 + ε2)-strong extractor for subnormalized states.
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D.3 Key-Privacy and uniformity
The lemmas in this section are all from [19]. The first states that a specific
kind of extractor can provides ν-key-privacy (Definition 5.1) and uniformity
(Definition 5.2).
Lemma D.6 ([19, Proposition 2]). Let Ext : {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}r−m → {0, 1}m
be a quantum-proof (k, ε)-strong extractors for subnormalized states for any
k and ε = ν2
√
2−k+m. And let h : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m be defined as
h(x, ℓ1‖ℓ2) := Ext(x, ℓ1)⊕ ℓ2. Then h provides ν-key-privacy.
The next lemma shows that the composition of two functions that pro-
vide key-privacy results in a new function also providing key-privacy. The
same holds for uniformity.
Lemma D.7 ([19, Proposition 4]). Let h1 : X×L1 → T1 and h2 : (X × T1)×
L2 → T2 be two functions. We define h : X × (L1 × L2) → (T1 × T2) with
h(x, ℓ1‖ℓ2) := t‖h2(x‖t, ℓ2) where t := h1(x, ℓ1). If h1 and h2 provide ν1 and
ν2-key-privacy, respectively, then h provides ν1 + ν2-key-privacy. And if h1
and h2 are both uniform, then h is uniform.
D.4 Guessing Games
The lemmas in this section are also from [19]. They are concerned with a
setting in which different players sharing a quantum state are trying to guess
the outcome of a measurement performed by one of them.
In the following we denote n EPR pairs by Φ+AB, and P
θ
x = H
θ|x〉〈x|Hθ
denotes a projector, which we use to measure qubits in either the compu-
tational or diagonal basis. Note that by measuring half of EPR pairs with
these projectors, the other half results in the state Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ, i.e.,
trA
[(
P θx ⊗ IB
)
Φ+AB
(
P θx ⊗ IB
)]
=
1
2n
Hθ|x〉〈x|Hθ.
Given two registers Θ and A, where Θ is classical and A is quantum, we
denote the map which performs this measurement on A according to Θ and
writes the result in a register X as MBB84ΘA,X , i.e.,
MBB84ΘA,X(ρΘA) =
∑
θ,x
trA |x〉〈x| ⊗
[(
|θ〉〈θ| ⊗ P θx
)
ρΘAB
(
|θ〉〈θ| ⊗ P θx
)]
.
The first lemma considers a two player setting, where one player obtains
the measurement outcome X and the second player wants to guess it.
Lemma D.8 ([19, Corollary 2]). Let ρΘE be any cq-state, where the strings
θ ∈ C ⊂ {0, 1}n are taken from a code C with minimal distance d, let E :
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L(HE) → L(HAB) be any CPTP map where L(HA) is an n qubit Hilbert
space, and let σXΘB :=MBB84ΘA,X ◦ E(ρΘE). Then
pguess(X|B)σ ≤ pguess(Θ|E)ρ
(
1 +
|C|
2d/2
)
.
The second lemma considers a three player setting. The first player
obtains the measurement outcome X, the second one has to get an outcome
X ′ that is close to X and the third one wants to guess X. Note that in this
setting, the all players have access to Θ.
Lemma D.9 ([19, Corollary 3, Remark 6]). Let ρΘE be any cq-state, where
the strings θ ∈ C ⊂ {0, 1}n are taken from a code C with minimal distance
d. Let E : L(HE)→ L(HABC) be any CPTP map where L(HA) and L(HB)
are an n qubit Hilbert spaces. Let σXX′ΘC := MBB84ΘA,X ◦ MBB84ΘB,X′ ◦ E(ρΘE),
i.e., both A and B are measured according to Θ and the results are written
in X and X ′, respectively. Finally, let σ1XX′ΘC be the projection of σXX′ΘC
on the space with w(X,X ′) ≤ ϕn. Then
pguess(X|ΘC)σ1 ≤ pguess(Θ|E)ρ
(
1 +
|C|2h(ϕ)n
2d
)
.
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